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ARTICLES
DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY
AND SECURITIES REGULATION
Chris Brummer*
Nowhere has disruptive technology had a more profound impact than in
financial services—and yet nowhere do academics and policymakers lack a
coherent theory of the phenomenon more, much less a coherent set of
regulatory prescriptions. Part of the challenge lies in the varied channels
through which innovation upends market practices. Problems also lurk in
the popular assumption that securities regulation operates against the
backdrop of stable market gatekeepers like exchanges, broker-dealers, and
clearing systems—a fact scenario increasingly out of sync in twenty-firstcentury capital markets.
This Article explains how technological innovation “disrupts” not only
capital markets but also the exercise of regulatory supervision and
oversight. It provides the first theoretical account tracking the migration of
technology across multiple domains of today’s securities infrastructure and
argues that an array of technological innovations are facilitating what can
be understood as the disintermediation of the traditional gatekeepers that
regulatory authorities have relied on (and regulated) since the 1930s for
investor protection and market integrity. Effective securities regulation will
thus have to be upgraded to account for a computerized (and often virtual)
market microstructure that is subject to accelerating change. To provide
context, this Article examines two key sources of disruptive innovation: (1)
the automated financial services that are transforming the meaning and
operation of market liquidity; and (2) the private markets—specifically, the
dark pools, electronic communication networks, 144A trading platforms,
and crowdfunding websites—that are creating an ever-expanding array of
alternatives for both securities issuances and trading.
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Many thanks to Dan Gorfine, Don
Langevoort, Robert Thompson, Rachel Loko, and Yesha Yadav. Ideas in this Article were
presented and discussed at Georgetown’s business law workshop and the Security Exchange
Commission’s Office of the Investor Advocate. Josh Nimmo, Scott Israelite, and Bodie
Stewart provided excellent research assistance, and the Article would not have been possible
without the professional assistance of Marilyn Raisch, Than Nguyen, Ester Cho, and Yelena
Rodriguez. I am also indebted to the staff of various regulatory and self-regulatory agencies
who, though requesting anonymity, provided invaluable perspective.
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For the first three decades following the birth of U.S. federal securities
regulation in the 1930s, the biggest obstacles to achieving the core policy
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goals of investor protection and market integrity came from either political
resistance or cyclical changes in the economy that unveiled managerial
incompetence, inadequate resources for regulatory authorities, or
increasingly imaginative financial schemes. But, for all the resistance, the
market ecosystem subject to securities regulation was quite stable and
experienced only incremental change. As a result, the forward-looking
legislative framework enacted in 1933 and in 1934 had time to mature and
even improve itself based on the presumptive market role and dominance of
key financial intermediaries.
By the turn of the century, however, securities regulation started to
experience far more profound challenges, as an unprecedented degree of
technological innovation began to upend the market microstructure
animating capital markets. With advances in computer processing and
information technology, key financial intermediaries like exchanges,
investment banks, and broker-dealers began to find themselves pushed to
the side by new market participants. Combined with intermittent reforms to
the capital raising process, public offerings found themselves too eclipsed
by new, increasingly sophisticated private players and venues that began to
host and mediate capital market liquidity.1
These developments are coming under scrutiny in the wake of the
financial crisis and as market innovation and disruption have achieved
breathtaking speed. More money is now raised in private placements than
in public offerings as new platforms have been developed to process
demand;2 securities of blue-chip firms are as readily traded off exchanges
as on them; human beings are no longer relied on to execute trades; and
private websites are poised to list ventures and early stage ventures.
Collectively, these developments, which are only accelerating with
technological innovation, have left regulators flat-footed as they, too, try to
find their way in the new ecosystem. To cope with the change, securities
authorities have adopted either a “hands-off” policy or one of almost
comical “concessions”—such as the recent discovery of Twitter and the
blessing by the agency of tweets as a means of communicating with
investors.3
Academics, meanwhile, have not fared much better. The acceleration of
disruptive innovation is driving deep divisions—to paraphrase Larry
Downes—between, on the one hand, the industrial law of the last century
and the regulatory machinery to enforce it and, on the other hand, the digital

1. See VLADIMIR IVANOV & SCOTT BAUGUESS, SEC, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: AN
ANALYSIS OF UNREGISTERED OFFERINGS USING THE REGULATION D EXEMPTION, 2009–2012,
at 8–9 (2013); Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise
of Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth of ECNs, 33 J. CORP. L. 865, 903–04 (2008);
Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3392
(2013).
2. IVANOV & BAUGUESS, supra note 1, at 8, 10.
3. Jessica Holzer & Greg Bensinger, SEC Embraces Social Media, WALL STREET J.
(Apr. 2, 2013, 7:49 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732361
1604578398862292997352 [http://perma.cc/NPJ2-TRB4].
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economy that now drives financial markets and competitive advantage.4 As
a result, changes in today’s market microstructure are subsumed by various
academic disciplines under generic categories of “disruption”—and in the
process undermine the capacity to discriminate among different regulatory
challenges—or commentators fail to fully grasp changes related to one
another to collectively bend the structure of capital markets.
To be sure, as this Article shows, not all “disruption” is the same. Some
forms of disruption are almost entirely technology based. Disruption under
this guise can arise in the crevices of existing regulatory frameworks. New
technologies can connect financial market participants in ways that bypass
institutions that have been required by law or market forces to screen
investors, bridge information asymmetries, or ensure market integrity. Yet
other innovations may have appeal or be popular precisely because of their
ability to engage, undermine, or elide existing regulatory and market
systems. In either case, technology can create opportunities for market
participants to do things that they were never able to do before, or to do
things better (or faster) than before, and in the process, challenge or
arbitrage established regulatory architectures.
Meanwhile, other forms of disruption have their origins in deregulatory
policies that have spawned new market infrastructures. That is, legislative
or agency reforms can and do create purposeful loopholes or exemptions
through which a new market infrastructure arises endogenously as a
response and, in the process, upends traditional regulatory and market
systems. Regulation-driven disruption can consequently create gaps in
existing rules and safeguards, but at the same time, erect new forms and
tactics for investor protection. And yet, in virtually every case, regulatory
and market disruptions overlap.
Regulatory reforms allow new
technologies to grow or chart new paths. Technology can spur regulatory
responses or even opportunities that enable arbitrage or change incentives
of market participants in unexpected ways.
These nuances make it difficult to develop a coherent typology of
disruptive technology for securities market regulation and even more
difficult to develop a coherent set of regulatory responses. Although it is
now taken for granted that disruptive technologies as a whole are generally
“less complicated, more accessible, and less expensive” than preexisting
ones, their impact on regulatory infrastructures are often diverse and thus
demand different policy responses.5 Making things worse, traditional
securities regulation is itself premised on the sale of securities to the
“public,” or has been premised on a relatively stable set of market
intermediaries—a fact scenario that no longer exists today.6 Technological
4. See generally LARRY DOWNES & PAUL NUNES,
THE AGE OF DEVASTATING INNOVATION (2014).

BIG BANG DISRUPTION: STRATEGY IN

5. Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruption Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 175, 182
(2014).
6. For perhaps indeed this reason, few theoretical articles have focused on technology
and securities regulation per se. For some of the most notable, see generally, for example,
John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern Securities
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innovation runs circles around the ability of regulators to respond and
adapt. The proliferation of new market infrastructures as a result challenges
academics and policymakers alike at both conceptual and operational levels
of regulatory design.
Creating a suitable theoretical framework for addressing disruptive
innovation thus requires optics flexible enough to accommodate and
examine diverse and dynamic market ecosystems against expanding sets of
policy goals and regulatory mandates. This, in turn, requires eschewing
traditional assumptions about how regulatory policy is operationalized and
forces commentators to evaluate concretely the functional implications of
disruption on the market.
Embracing such an approach proffers powerful policy analytics.
Disruptive innovation, as this Article demonstrates, is often a story of not
only market participation but also regulatory disintermediation.
Consequently, when faced with the prospect of new transformative
technologies, policy responses should identify what actor or aspect of the
preexisting financial system is potentially being disintermediated by the
technology. Second, and closely related, market supervisors should explore
whether other microstructural developments or new institutions fill (or
could fill) the regulatory vacuum or, alternatively, exacerbate the
disintermediation at issue. And only then, finally, after undertaking the
analysis, should interventions be devised to promote the underlying policy
goals of the respective regulator while recognizing the dynamism of
constantly evolving markets. To demonstrate this, this Article examines
varying sources of disruptive innovation: automated electronic trading,
dark pools of liquidity for exchange-traded securities, 144A trading
platforms for private placements, and crowdfunding websites for start-ups
enabled under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act.
By recasting disruptive innovation as one of financial market (and
gatekeeping) disintermediation, this Article also provides a roadmap for

Regulation, 52 BUS. LAW. 1195 (1997) (noting the potentially information-enhancing
benefits proffered by the internet); Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the
Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1985) [hereinafter Information
Technology] (same); Donald C. Langevoort, Toward More Effective Risk Disclosure for
Technology-Enhanced Investing, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 753 (1997) (considering the promise of
technology-enhanced investing for addressing information asymmetries). Otherwise, most
other thoughtful interventions have focused on discrete manifestations of disintermediation
in select markets or markets enabled by looser regulatory oversight. See generally Joan
MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and
the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879 (2011) (examining the operation of
crowdfunding exemptions and its impact on securities regulation); Donald C. Langevoort &
Robert B. Thompson, IPOs and the Slow Death of Section 5, 102 KY. L.J. 891 (2014)
(examining exemptions and their impact on the market for public offerings); Jonathan R.
Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Regulating Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: A Law
and Economics Perspective, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 17 (1999) (highlighting the value of
Alternative Trading Systems (ATS) and the need for enabling, as opposed to mandatory,
securities regimes); Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. 179 (2012) (noting the growth of private placement intermediaries and the impact on
disclosure).
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better conceptualizing the future of securities regulation and rethinking the
means with which we practice it. Although 144A trading, high frequency
trading, dark pools, and crowdfunding have attracted a good deal of
attention over the last couple of years from journalists, policymakers,
scholars, and practitioners, they have yet to be addressed collectively from
one theoretical vantage point. As a result, an all-too-obvious silo thinking
has emerged, failing to connect microfinance to crowdfunding, the
technological innovations in crowdfunding to new private placement
platforms, and so on. This Article represents the first attempt to connect the
dots. By tackling the hard work of charting these developments along a
market and regulatory continuum, we will see how technology imposes a
variety of interdependent and interrelated repercussions throughout
securities markets that are fundamentally reshaping how they operate—and
changing the effectiveness of the New Deal-era oversight and supervision.
Before jumping into this Article, one methodological note is in order.
One of the difficulties of theorizing the scope of the impact of technological
disruption and securities regulation is that it involves assessing both
regulatory and market infrastructures across diverse issue areas and
contexts. As such, a multidisciplinary approach is required that employs
broad-based regulatory history, market theory and practice, and rigorous
institutional analytics. With this in mind, in Part I, I offer an overview of
the New Deal regulatory apparatus that continues to govern securities
markets today. Part II introduces and explains the most dramatic forms of
technological innovation in securities markets, and Part III then shows how
these innovations disintermediate traditional regulatory gatekeepers and
thus disrupt longstanding regulatory practice. Finally, in Part IV, this
Article borrows from the New Governance literature7 to outline
administrative reforms useful for engaging the challenge of disruptive
innovation and highlights the necessity of adaptive regulatory regimes for
high-tech capital markets animated by constant microstructural change.
I. TWENTIETH-CENTURY MARKET
AND REGULATORY INFRASTRUCTURE
The legislative framework for U.S. securities regulation is both a
response to the financial shenanigans leading up to the stock market crashes
of the late 1920s and a national framework for ongoing supplemental
regulation and oversight to be practiced by the then-newly created
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or “the Commission”). As
such, even after more than a half decade of reforms and revisions, it reflects
both the primary policy concerns of the time, as well as the market
ecosystem that dominated the early twentieth century.
Securities transactions in the decades preceding the creation of the
federal securities laws were simple, albeit flawed. A company seeking to
raise capital issued and sold securities to the public, often assisted by an

7. See infra note 309 and accompanying text.
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investment bank that would help identify an appropriate wholesale and
retail market for the securities and potentially underwrite the offering.
Brokers then marketed shares to the public. Depending on the prestige and
notoriety of the company, the firm’s shares or bonds were listed on an
exchange or traded over the counter.8
The issuance and sale of securities were, if not laissez-faire activities in
the strictest sense, at least chronically under regulated. A collection of
relatively weak “blue sky laws,” actions under common law fraud, or
reputational constraints were relied on to restrict market participants’ bad
conduct.9 With few investor protections, issuers lied about their earnings,
plans, and even operations; brokers marketed securities unscrupulously,
often lying to unsuspecting investors; and exchanges listed securities of
questionable quality, with little to no help in maintaining quality or market
stability.
By the early 1920s, individuals such as Ivar Krueger graced the cover of
Time magazine after raising millions of dollars to fund a Ponzi scheme built
on repaying loans and doling out dividends to investors until the money
dried up.10 Along the way, neither the exchange nor brokers monopolizing
its trade contacted or discussed the financial statements of the presumed
auditor. Similarly, increasingly complex frauds were committed against the
public—like that perpetrated by the Musica brothers, who created an entire
network of fictitious firms to bolster false financial statements (and inflate
earnings) for the then-New York Stock Exchange (NYSE or “the
Exchange”) listed McKesson & Robbins.11

8. See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 353 (2012) (noting that listing
on certain exchanges was “a means of signaling quality to potential traders”).
9. Although state level initiatives had been launched selectively in other states targeting
specific industrial activities and disclosures for out-of-state issuers, Kansas is largely
credited with enacting the first blue sky law in 1911, which required companies selling
securities in the state, as well as stockbrokers, to register with the bank commissioner and
disclose information about their operations. See Jerry W. Markham, Accountants Make
Miserable Policemen: Rethinking the Federal Securities Laws, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM.
REG. 725, 731 (2003). That said, the most sweeping rules were those embraced in New
York. In New York, brokers were prohibited from making false or misleading rumors,
statements, or advertisements in connection with the sale of securities and from engineering
the kinds of fictitious transactions that were making their way to the front pages of the
nation’s newspapers. Id. at 731–32. Moreover, the Martin Act, adopted in 1921, authorized
the New York Attorney General to investigate and seek injunctions against fraudulent
securities practices or manipulative activities, with much lower-level burdens of proof than
those required under common law. Id. at 732. Nevertheless, even in New York, insider
trading was largely permitted, as was margin trading, which allowed banks to make shortterm loans using securities as collateral via what was then known as the “call money”
market. Id. Furthermore, with the economy roaring, actions were rare.
10. See Justin Fox, Forget Charles Ponzi (and Bernie Madoff). Ivar Kreuger Is the AllTime Fraud Champ, TIME (Jan. 5, 2009), http://business.time.com/2009/01/05/forgetcharles-ponzi-and-bernie-madoff-ivar-kreuger-is-the-all-time-fraud-champ/ [http://perma.cc/
PB99-C9FA].
11. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 139–40 (2006).
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The results were catastrophic. As President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
close aid, and future Supreme Court Justice, Felix Frankfurter bemoaned:
During the height of the greatest speculative carnival in the world’s
history, billions of new securities were floated, of which a large part had
no relation to the country’s need and which inevitably became worthless;
worthless not merely for millions who had sought speculative gains, but
for those other millions who sought to conserve the savings of a
lifetime.12

After the October 1929 stock market crash and the following years of
falling stock prices, the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency
launched an investigation, known now as “the Pecora Committee,” into the
causes of the crisis.13 The proceedings culminated in an assertion of a new
“social control of finance,” operationalized via the 1933 Securities Act
(“the Securities Act” or “the 1933 Act”) and the 1934 Exchange Act (“the
Exchange Act” or “the 1934 Act”), along with subsequent streams of SEC
rulemaking that in many ways continue today.14
Underpinning the reforms was an understanding of issuers, brokerdealers, and exchanges as the primary nodes of market infrastructure and
the central culprits of the undue market “speculation” leading up to the
crisis.15 Regulating each as agents of the investing “public” thus not only
provided a response to the earlier decade of fraud, but also a forwardlooking framework for future market oversight. Key to the regulatory
policies was disclosure—in the case of firms and broker-dealers, disclosure
about material information relating to issuers of securities and in the case of
exchanges, information relating to the market value of such securities.
A. Public Companies
The centerpiece of the New Deal legislative framework was enhanced
disclosure for companies selling securities.
Investors, authorities
recognized, needed protection. A prerequisite for such protection was
having access to information necessary to making informed investment
decisions. Up to that point, investors were far from being guaranteed “full
information” relating to their investments. With no requirement or
government agency credibly compelling disclosures from companies,
“prospectuses used to sell stocks were ‘little more than notices’”16 and were

12. A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law and the New Deal Justices,
95 VA. L. REV. 841, 849 (2009).
13. Cf. id. at 852.
14. Id. at 846–72.
15. This is demonstrated in the very scope of the Pecora Commission’s work: to make
an inquiry into any company issuing securities, to make an investigation of the “business
conduct and practices of security exchanges and of the members thereof,” and “to make a
thorough and complete investigation of the practices with respect to the buying and selling
and the borrowing and lending of securities.” COMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, STOCK
EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 2 (1934).
16. Markham, supra note 9, at 734 (citing United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621,
639 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)).
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“too often deliberately misleading and illusive.”17 With this in mind, and
with the Krueger and Musica scandals still fresh in the memory of the
country’s voters, Roosevelt promised in his presidential nomination
acceptance speech to “let[] in []the light of day on issues of securities,
foreign and domestic, which are offered.”18
The Securities Act was, among other things, the first legislative step for
achieving this goal. According to its dictates, whose relevant parts for this
discussion were finalized in 1964, if a company crossed a certain
threshold—by either selling securities to the public,19 allowing for their
securities to be traded on exchanges,20 or becoming too big21—it would
have to make financial statements public and ensure their accuracy.22 Then
under the Exchange Act, promulgated a year later in 1934, these disclosures
had to be updated on a quarterly and yearly basis and subject to varying
scrutiny by auditors and other securities professionals.23
Section 5 of the Securities Act additionally subjected public offerings of
securities to certain procedural hurdles.24 In its original iteration, the statute
limited sales efforts to after the SEC had declared the registration statement
“effective.”25 This then ignited a two-decade-long debate between
regulators and industry as to the “proper balance between the demand for
pre-effective marketing and the concerns about gun-jumping.”26
Eventually, a compromise was reached in 1954 that prohibited sales and
marketing of materials until a registration statement is filed and imposed a
waiting period of at least twenty days, during which marketing efforts could
commence, but securities could not be sold.27 Only after the registration
statement became effective, which generally involved SEC review, could
sales commence.28
All along, a new federal antifraud regime was launched. Section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 created an expansive private right of
action for misrepresentations and omissions made in connection with the
sale of securities.29 Meanwhile, section 11 of the Securities Act imposed

17. 1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 27 (3d ed. 1993).
18. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 19 (3d ed.
2003).
19. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2012).
20. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g).
22. Id. §§ 78m(a), (i).
23. Id. § 78m.
24. Id. § 78e.
25. Id. § 77e (noting that no sales can commence “unless a registration statement is in
effect”).
26. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 6, at 891.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 77h; see also id. § 78f (requiring that marketing be made through a
legally valid prospectus).
28. See id. § 78f.
29. See id. § 78j(b); Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (2014).

986

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

heavier liability for misrepresentations in a registration statement,30 just as
section 12 gave potential rescission rights where the procedural hurdles
were not followed.31
At the same time, some limited exemptions to both the procedural and
informational regulations were available. The broadest exemption was
section 4(2) of the 1933 Act (now section 4(a)(2)), which exempts
transactions “not involving any public offering”—what today are known as
“private placements”—from the registration requirements of section 5.32 In
1935, the SEC then interpreted the exemption to mean that companies can
generally avoid registration if offerings are made among a small number of
sophisticated investors and not broadly distributed.33 Supreme Court and
other federal cases, over the following twenty years, also elaborated the
ambiguous clause and stressed the need for investors not only to be
sophisticated, but also to have access to all relevant information.34
Secondary sales also had to meet the same strict investor thresholds and, as
always, avoid trading on exchanges.35
Collectively, the New Deal framework created a broad regulatory
perimeter for securities issuances. Under sections 5 and 15(d) of the 1933
Act, which were added in 1936, public offerings required registration with
the SEC.36 Section 12(g) of the 1934 Act, meanwhile, restricted the
number of shareholders an unregistered company could have after
achieving a significant economic size before becoming subject to reporting
obligations.37 Similarly, section 12(b) effectively prohibited unregistered
companies from listing their securities on exchanges like the NYSE.
Instead, trading would have to take place in the over-the-counter (OTC)
markets where transactions have been executed through opaque and ad hoc
networks of brokers and dealers, which have historically been more
expensive.38 Once any of the thresholds under sections 15(d), 12(b), or
12(g) of the 1934 Act were met, periodic reporting under the Exchange Act
became mandatory.39 Finally, privately issued securities under section 4(2)

30. 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
31. Id. § 77l.
32. Id. § 77d(2).
33. Relevant factors included the number of offerees, relationship of the offerees to each
other, the number of units offered, the size of the offering, and the manner of the offering.
See Letter of General Counsel Discussing the Second Clause of Section 4(1), Securities Act
Release No. 285, 1935 WL 27785 (Jan. 24, 1935) [hereinafter Letter of General Counsel].
34. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124–25 (1953) (noting that
because “[t]he design of the statute is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of
information thought necessary to informed investment decisions . . . the applicability of [the
section] should turn on whether the particular class of persons affected needs the protection
of the Act”).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b).
36. Id. §§ 77e, 78o(d) (requiring registration of public offerings).
37. See id. § 78l(g).
38. Walter Werner, Adventure in Social Control of Finance: The National Market
System for Securities, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1238 (1975).
39. ANNA T. PINEDO, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
ABOUT PERIODIC REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S. ISSUERS: OVERVIEW (2015),
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of the 1933 Act could only be bought and sold amongst investors who could
demonstrate high levels of sophistication and access to information
normally required in a registration statement.40
Circumventing registration thus likely increased the costs of capital for
many companies. They could either avoid registration by limiting the
number of shareholders they had and limiting the trading of their securities
on thin OTC markets, which lacked reliable means of tracking the prices of
stocks,41 or they could issue private securities to a small pool of
sophisticated investors where secondary trading opportunities were limited
and where notice of offerings had to be discrete.42 In either case, investors
charged a premium for the limited transferability, lower transparency, and
higher risk of the security and, in the process, drive up the cost of finance.
B. Broker-Dealers
Broker-Dealers would also attract more regulatory scrutiny. Oversight
would, however, be asserted incrementally, and often circuitously, via a
series of delegations of authority to a range of supervisors. Eventually,
however, the SEC would come to assume some of its most direct authority
as a growing volume of technology-enabled securities transactions
overwhelmed the back office operations of securities firms.
1. Delegation Under the New Deal
The 1929 stock market crash needed enablers, and broker-dealers topped
the list of likely culprits. After all, exchanges needed broker-dealers to
make markets in listed securities (a topic discussed in the following
subsection), and issuers needed salesmen to sell their securities. And, as
brokers were paid on commission, not the appreciation of the securities,
they were incentivized to do whatever it took to sell stocks or to act on their
own account (as what the law recognizes as “dealers”) and to make money
on speculation and market volatility.
The criticism was not without reason. Indeed, turn of the century brokers
turned out to be especially good at beguiling people into parting with their
money and, according to a 1933 House Committee Report, routinely
worked “securities of an essentially unsound character” on an
“unsuspecting public.”43 Moreover, less than fair and honest marketing
was combined with margin investing as investors (and broker-dealers)
borrowed money to make investments and outsized bets. The result, as
Frankfurter acknowledged during the subsequent consideration and debate

http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/FAQ-Periodic-Reporting-Requirements-forUS-Issuers-Overview.pdf [http://perma.cc/KJ9W-VHTY].
40. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953) (requiring that investors should be
provided with adequate access to information usually contained in a registration statement).
41. See MARK INGEBRETSEN, NASDAQ: A HISTORY OF THE MARKET THAT CHANGED
THE WORLD 38 (2002).
42. See id. at 31–32.
43. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 27.
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of the Exchange Act, was a speculative bubble that would upend the
country’s capital markets and savings capacity:
By all the subtle and mesmerizing arts of modern salesmanship, the
sellers of securities had so extended the field of security buyers that 55
per cent of all savings . . . went into publicly marketed securities. . . . The
enormous, easy profits from their distribution stimulated the creation and
sale of billions in securities, which have burdened industry and wasted or
misdirected the capital resources of the nation.44

With this in mind, the Exchange Act was created to bear down more
forcefully on the sales and marketing of securities. As mentioned above,
section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5 prohibited the sale of securities through
material misstatements and omissions in the marketing of investments
during initial public offerings (IPOs), secondary trading, and even private
placements. As such, it created a broad and federal layer of investor
protection wherever the sale of a security arose.
The Exchange Act also provided the basis for more direct oversight for
broker-dealers in particular. Though lacking precision as to the degree of
discretion the SEC would ultimately enjoy, section 15 of the Exchange Act
empowered the SEC to require broker-dealers to register with the
commission and to register the securities in which they traded.45 The SEC
was also charged with the supervision of a firm’s structure and taking
measures to assure their solvency.46 Accordingly, under this writ of
authority, the SEC promulgated rules requiring the registration of all
broker-dealers involved in OTC transactions and mandated that registered
firms meet minimum capital requirements and provide adequate disclosures
to investors.47
Critically, OTC broker-dealers were also ultimately required to join what
was then the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) (that later
became the Financial Industry Registry Authority (FINRA)), the selfregulatory organization (SRO) for the industry created in 1939.48 In time,
NASD imposed obligations on broker-dealers to “know thy customer” (a
requirement that the NYSE also imposed on member broker-dealers).49
44. Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 12, at 849 (emphasis added) (quoting Felix
Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act: II, FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 53, 54).
45. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(a)(1)–(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
46. Id.
47. Robert L.D. Colby & Lanny A. Schwartz, What Is a Broker-Dealer?, in 2 BROKERDEALER REGULATION 2-1, 2-5 to 2-7 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 2d ed. 2011).
48. See Nat’l Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 2211, 1939 WL
36389 (Aug. 7, 1939). Under the Maloney Act, which revised the Exchange Act, market
associations were given the right to register with the SEC and enforce a code of conduct on
their members. And just as important, members could charge nonmembers higher prices
while trading with one another at retail. With such incentives, the Maloney Act would
ultimately create powerful economic incentives for market participants to seek selfregulation (giving rise to the NASD) and for broker-dealers to submit to association (and, by
extension, federal) oversight. See INGEBRETSEN, supra note 41, at 42.
49. For an overview of FINRA’s “know thy customer” expectations, see Prepare to
Invest, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/investors/suitability-what-investors-need-know (last
visited Nov. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/9U6G-XQ8J].
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That is, broker-dealers were required to have “reasonable grounds for
believing that [a] recommendation [was] suitable for [a] customer upon the
basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other security
holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.”50 This suitability rule
then itself became interpreted to require brokers to obtain information
concerning the customers’ other securities before making suggestions
concerning highly speculative investments.51
Finally, section 7 of the Exchange Act tackled the challenge of margin
lending—which, as discussed above, had in part enabled and exacerbated
the crisis by allowing market participants to borrow money to purchase
shares. As with section 15, the issue would be tackled through delegation.
Here, however, the Federal Reserve Board, not the SEC, was given the
authority to regulate “the amount of credit that may be initially
extended . . . on any security,” and broker-dealers were prohibited from
extending credit for any customer in contravention of the rules.52 With its
newfound powers, the Federal Reserve subsequently promulgated
Regulation T, which prohibits the extension of credit on marginable
securities beyond a certain percentage of those securities’ value.53
Though only of limited relevance for this Article, it must be added for the
sake of completeness that in addition to the regulation of brokers, even
more basic advisory and investment management functions were targeted as
well under other congressional dictates. In the years leading up to the Great
Depression, investment companies and trusts had become commonplace in
American society. Unfortunately, although these companies were, as Ken
Gailbraith noted, “greatly admired marvels of the time,” they were also
highly problematic, and the SEC observed that many investment companies
sold securities like door-to-door salesmen, advancing the interests of fund
managers over investors.54 To speak to abusive practices pertaining to the
counsel given to investors, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 imposed
on managers a range of disclosure and recordkeeping obligations (and later,

50. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BROKER-DEALER REGULATION IN A NUTSHELL 180 (2d ed.
2011) (quoting FINRA Rule 2310).
51. See id. at 180–81.
52. C. Edward Fletcher III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws,
1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1106 (quoting Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 7(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78g(a) (2012)).
53. Importantly,
[v]iolations of these limits often return to haunt a broker in the course of litigation.
Customers may point to margin violations offensively, after losing a large sum of
money on a highly leveraged position created on borrowed money, or defensively,
against a collection action by a broker whom a customer has failed to pay
following such a loss.
Id.
54. Kara M. Stein, Comm’r, SEC, Mutual Funds—The Next 75 Years (June 15, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/mutual-funds-the-next-75-years-stein.html
[http://perma.cc/N32G-JAJL]; see Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to
-21 (2012); Barry P. Barbash & Jai Massari, The Investment Advisers Act of 1940:
Regulation by Accretion, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 627 (2008).
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standards of conduct for registered advisors).55 Meanwhile, the Investment
Company Act requires mutual funds to register with the SEC and prohibits
self-dealing by fund professionals.56 Furthermore, the legislation bans
outright affiliated transactions that would otherwise create incentives for
fund managers to exploit shareholders.57
2. 1960s Crisis Response, or New Deal 2.0
One unusual aspect of this approach was that, despite the enormity of the
job, the SEC’s authority was both modest and shared with other actors.
This institutional posture in turn generated considerable ambiguity about
the writ of the agency’s authority to regulate broker-dealers. Two decades
later, however, the SEC’s position was reaffirmed and bolstered with
additional new responsibilities, which deserve special mention, especially
in light of the particularly important role played by technological change in
driving the agency’s ascent to power.
In the aftermath of the Great Depression, much of the policymaking
energy relating to brokers and dealers, beyond the surveillance of fraud,
focused on the commissions paid to brokers on exchanges.58 But in the
1960s, Wall Street found itself on the brink of crisis in part due to its own
good fortune. As SEC Chairman Hamer Budge testified, an exponential
growth in securities trading threatened, quite unexpectedly, to undo the
industry: “[B]rokerage firms [found] themselves in the paradox of being
forced out of business by having too much business.”59 Between 1964 and
1968, the average daily reported volume on the NYSE jumped 265 percent,
from just under five million shares per average day in 1964 to nearly fifteen
million in December 1968.60
In theory, the rise in transactions was good for business. But brokerdealers were not equipped to handle the back-office paper crunch.
Financial transactions at the time required settlement and clearing
procedures where orders were routinely written by hand and stock
certificates were physically handed over and delivered to investors. With
the jump in volume and inadequate manpower, however, this system broke
down: “Stock certificates and related documents were piled ‘halfway to the
ceiling’ in some offices; clerical personnel were working overtime, six and

55. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21.
56. See id. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (requiring the registration of investment companies, which
include mutual funds). Notably, even this sector is facing prospects of weak market
discipline and performance by market intermediaries. Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation
of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1985 (2010) (arguing that weak
market discipline, enabled in part by competition, requires rethinking the regulation of the
mutual fund industry).
57. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21.
58. See infra Part I.C.
59. SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 451 (alteration in original).
60. Id.
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seven days a week, with some firms using a second or even a third shift [for
staff] to process each day’s transactions.”61
Part of the increase was due to the rise in institutional investing.
Professional market makers exploited multiple telephone lines and faxes to
connect themselves to other firms and financial institutions in order to
increase the volumes of transactions they made. But keeping track of it all
was messy. On the front end, pricing was far from efficient, especially for
smaller, less well-known OTC stocks. Unlike the NYSE, where, as seen
below, special broker-dealers (aptly named “specialists”) had monopolies
on the shares they traded, traders and market makers routinely competed
with one another to buy and sell a particular security.62 But they did so
with relatively little information. Most broker-dealers subscribed to
services publishing daily quotes for bid and ask prices for certain stocks,
and the quotes would set the parameters for most trading taking place that
day. But no rules required larger firms to post quotes, or, for that matter,
follow through on the quotes they gave. Furthermore, firms polled by the
company providing the list were not those doing the largest volume of
trading in that particular stock, and their own internal records were often
flawed or incomplete. So, these stock quotes were very far from being an
accurate real-time source of data.63
With transactions multiplying, complaints to the SEC about broker-dealer
conduct quadrupled.64 Some firms responded by hiring new people, pairing
them with experienced workers and putting them to work immediately to
handle and process orders. According to the leading treatise of the period,
this only resulted in poor training and a decrease in output by experienced
workers who had to teach colleagues how to do their jobs.65 Meanwhile,
other firms attempted to abruptly adopt computerized facilities and leapfrog
the problem of manual recordkeeping. This too, however, was largely
unsuccessful and even doomed leading Wall Street brokerages unprepared
and inexperienced in technology. Goodbody & Co., then the fifth-largest
firm on Wall Street, was doomed, according to a Merrill Lynch banker
familiar with the company, due to its “overambitious efforts to automate.”66
When it was subsequently saved in a merger, it only succeeded in
increasing the firm’s woes. “It was trapped in the midst of change: efforts
to automate failed, while manual procedure was deserted in anticipation of
As Joel Seligman reports, other “instant
automation’s success.”67
computerization” problems plagued other firms that faced liquidation,
including Lehman Brothers, which only narrowly escaped collapse.68

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id. at 456.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 456–57.
Id. at 457.
Id.
Id.
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The combination of breakdowns in back-office operations, higher
operational costs, bad brokerage management, and debt had, by 1969, sent
more Wall Street brokerages out of business than at any point in U.S.
history. In response, the SEC eventually imposed higher requirements on
brokerages than the modest $5000 net capital threshold the agency had
required of broker-dealers prior to the crisis and the NYSE’s $50,000
requirement for member firms carrying customers’ accounts.69
Even more critically, to strengthen the authority of the SEC over the
industry, Congress passed the Securities Investor Protection Act,70 which
gave the SEC authority to require an SRO to adopt rules, practices, and
inspections relating to the financial condition and health of the SRO’s
members.71 Four years later, the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 were
passed, which, among other things, brought broker-dealers who traded
exclusively on national securities exchanges directly into the regulatory fold
and made them subject to the same Exchange Act requirements (and SEC
oversight) as OTC broker-dealers.72 For the first time, the NYSE not only
governed conduct but also took a step toward overseeing the financial
integrity of key market intermediaries given what was believed to be the
relative inflexibility of firms to automate and the challenges of
intermediating in high order, high data environments.
C. Stock Exchanges
The final objective of the postwar regulatory infrastructure was the
oversight and supervision of stock exchanges. The regulation of brokerdealers, though an important aspect of the post-crash securities oversight,
was not enough. Instead, as Justice Frankfurter himself acknowledged,
“another . . . evil . . . must ultimately be reached, and that is the creation of
boom markets for stocks through . . . the Exchange.”73 No longer would it
or should it be the means for generating destructive speculation by the
American investing public.
As a conceptual matter, stock exchanges have always exerted both
economic and regulatory importance. On the one hand, unlike OTC
markets, where dealers processed ad hoc orders free of listing requirements
and disciplinary rules, exchanges have been critical price discovery
mechanisms for stocks and bonds of major companies.74 Once securities

69. Id.
70. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa–lll (2012).
71. See SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 465.
72. See John G. Gillis, Securities Law and Regulation: Securities Acts Amendments of
1975, 31 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 12, 13 (1975) (noting that broker-dealers that previously did not
have to register, including specialists, floor traders, and floor brokers, now had to register
with the SEC).
73. Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 12, at 858 n.67.
74. See Jennifer Victoria Christine Dean, Paradigm Shifts & Unintended Consequences:
The Death of the Specialist, the Rise of High Frequency Trading & the Problem of DutyFree Liquidity in Equity Markets, 8 FIU L. REV. 217, 237 (2012) (noting that exchanges
“promoted the dissemination of information via the process of dynamic price-discovery,”
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were released onto exchanges, buyers could send their orders to brokers,
who then transmitted the order to brokers on the exchange and to specialists
who made markets for the securities. The bid and ask prices for the orders
(or quotes) could then be compared on the floor and made public. By thus
providing a focal point for trading, exchanges not only afforded investors
opportunities to enter and exit investments quickly,75 but they also
generated valuable data for pricing stocks and bonds traded on secondary
markets.
Indeed, the extent of concentration was so great that for many experts it
created strong anticompetitive undercurrents. To understand why, it is
important to note that price discovery has historically been an expensive
business, with low levels of competition. Trading floors allowed the
congregation of buyers and sellers of securities, but
real estate had to be purchased on the front end for a large trading facility.
Then a large trading floor had to be built on which traders could
collectively operate and interact. Finally, facilities had to be added for
communication with linked institutions, either in the form of courier posts
or phone banks.
Floor exchanges were also highly dependent upon human skill that is
not easily replicable. When a client ma[de] a limit order, a floor broker
must calculate (or guess) the appropriate amount to initially bid for on the
exchange on behalf of the client based on his monitoring of the day’s
trading. Likewise, [personnel] must monitor limit orders and respond
quickly to orders as they arrive. All along, time is critical—the longer it
takes for execution of an order, the more likely the order may be cancelled
or matched with another investor. Due to the various emotional,
intellectual, and even physical demands of the job, the supply of skilled
traders ha[d] always been limited and labor costs, high.76

Consequently, the barriers to entry to the exchange business were high, and
exchanges frequently could charge super premiums for their work.77
Yet, significant responsibilities accompanied such authority. Stock
exchanges, even in the nineteenth century, were expected to fulfill the
“important mission” of establishing “a barrier between the public and those
fraudulent, superficial, and impracticable enterprises and schemes
which . . . [were calculated] to induce the public to invest in them.”78
Exchanges thus had established listing committees tasked with examining
listings by the late 1880s. By the 1930s, the NYSE in particular required
that companies seeking to list (or sell) their securities on its floors first “file
an application describing in detail the firm’s capital structure, history,
liabilities, properties, financial statements over the past five years, and
unlike other markets in which “the process of price-discovery generally occurs over a longer
period of time”).
75. Id.
76. Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1435, 1459 (2008).
77. See id. at 1455.
78. JOHN R. DOS PASSOS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF STOCK-BROKERS AND STOCKEXCHANGES vi (1882).
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officers” and imposed restrictions on short selling when the markets
dived.79 Exchanges also required that specialists—the broker-dealers
dominating the trade of some securities—make themselves available to
stabilize markets where the price of a security jumped or fell erratically.80
The stock market crash of the late 1920s, however, would prove
untrammeled self-regulation to be insufficient. For one, issuers looking to
bypass the NYSE’s rules always could choose to register an “unlisted”
security on any of the other eighteen securities exchanges that “permitted
securities to be traded on an ‘unlisted’ basis.”81 Furthermore, and arguably
more troubling, even the NYSE failed to enforce vigorously its own
standards.82 Indeed, exchanges lacked clear rules with regard to how
financial statements should be reported to investors or to exchanges.83
Consequently, in the congressional hearings leading up to the creation of
the Exchange Act, many observers felt that self-regulation lacked teeth and
seriousness. Frankfurter in particular heartily agreed that the exchange was
“long overdue” for governmental regulation, advising Roosevelt: “There
has been more than ample time for self-regulation, and self-regulation they
have shown is not in them.”84
Several steps were thus taken over the ensuing decades to rein in
exchanges. As discussed above, the challenges posed by unlisted
(essentially OTC) securities were remedied, at least in part, by bringing
OTC securities under the Exchange Act’s size and public offering
parameters.85 If issuers attained a certain economic impact or passed the
shareholder threshold, they were required to report to the SEC.86 Although
price discovery was not as high as that offered on exchanges, disclosure as
to the underlying issuer was mandatory.
Reforms for exchanges would, at least ostensibly, be more direct. The
Exchange Act endowed the SEC under sections 5 and 6 with an affirmative
grant of rulemaking authority and broad regulatory powers over the nation’s
securities exchanges (dubbed “national securities exchanges” in the
enabling legislation), their members (who were largely broker-dealers), and

79. SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 46. A prospective issuer would also have to proffer,
along with its application, copies of its charter, bylaws, leases, and other relevant corporate
documents. See id. Stock exchanges also adopted a rule requiring brokers to secure written
permission from clients before lending shares to short sellers. See id. at 12.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 47.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 48–49.
84. Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 12, at 858 (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter,
Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to President Franklin D. Roosevelt (Feb. 14, 1934) (on file
with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress, Reel 155)). Senator Fletcher,
who introduced the bill in the Senate, similarly declared that reforms were necessary so “that
the operation of securities exchanges shall never again intensify . . . or help precipitate a
business depression” and to ensure that the stock exchange was a place “for investors and
not . . . [a] resort for those who would speculate or gamble.” Werner, supra note 38, at 1245.
85. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1) (2012) (indicating
that once issuers meet certain asset and shareholder thresholds, registration is necessary).
86. Id.
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the securities traded on exchanges. Along with overseeing the registration
of exchanges, the SEC received more explicit competencies in areas aimed
at ensuring reasonable rates of commission, interest, listing, and other
charges, as well as sweeping residual powers to alter or supplement
exchange rules in “supplemental” areas of regulatory concern.87
Furthermore, the Exchange Act targeted the internal operations of
exchanges. It explicitly authorized the fledgling SEC to write rules to
“regulate or prevent floor trading by exchange members” and “to prevent
excessive off-floor trading by members if the Commission found it
‘detrimental to the maintenance of a fair and orderly market.’”88 Attempts
to circumvent exchange rules relating to exchange-listed securities could
thus be minimized.
Similar writs of authority were granted with regard to the regulation of
specialists. As mentioned above, a particular brand of broker-dealers called
“specialists” made themselves available to stabilize markets and “make”
markets as either buyers or sellers where the price of a security jumped or
fell erratically. In order to do so, they maintained a special order book
where other brokers would leave customers’ limit orders and where they
had advance knowledge of the orders from the market. With the help of the
order book, specialists could maintain a sufficient inventory of a stock
where it appeared demand would spike and few might be willing to sell,
and they could liquidate investments in order to free up capital to purchase
securities where customers sold shares and no other buyers were available.
This created significant informational advantages, however, insofar as
specialists (or their friends) could extract super-premiums for their marketmaking activities.89 In light thereof, section 11(b) of the Exchange Act
grants extraordinary power to the Commission to oversee specialists and
restricts the specialists to those dealings reasonably necessary to permit
them “to maintain fair and orderly markets.”90
That said, many attempts to take on the often-conflicted nature of the
exchange specialist were scrapped by the SEC in order to preserve the
liquidity of the NYSE, which hosted upwards of 85 percent of the country’s
top stocks and the stability-enhancing services the specialists provided.91
87. Specifically, “section 19(b) of the Exchange Act gave the SEC sweeping residual
powers to alter or supplement exchange rules in twelve enumerated areas and ‘similar
matters.’” Werner, supra note 38, at 1245 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)).
88. HAZEN, supra note 50, at 116.
89. See Nicholas Wolfson & Thomas A. Russo, The Stock Exchange Specialist: An
Economic and Legal Analysis, 1970 DUKE L.J. 707, 717 (citing to language in the House
Report accompanying the progenitor of the Exchange Act). Specialists were not the only
ones with informational advantages. Indeed, just being on the trading floor offered a number
of advantages. Floor brokers, in particular, were in “a position to discount or revise [their]
market appraisals almost instantaneously . . . [as well as] increase, decrease, or
cancel . . . orders more rapidly than a non-member to whom the same information [was] only
made available at a later time.” SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 146 (quoting SEC, REPORT ON
THE FEASIBILITY AND ADVISABILITY OF THE COMPLETE SEGREGATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF
DEALER AND BROKER 16–17 (1936)).
90. 15 U.S.C § 78k(b).
91. See SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 145–49.
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Yet the lighter touch would have significant consequences for the business
of trading. Customers seeking to trade NYSE-listed stocks would have
little bargaining power over the Commission’s members of the exchange
charged. And as a member-owned nonprofit organization, a club of leading
brokers and dealers, the exchange’s own rules in the matter were largely
geared toward increasing the profits of exchange professionals and not
toward the investing public.92
Gradually, however, as the nation’s market ecosystem developed and
matured, the monopoly rents exercised by the exchange members would
serve to push customers to respond in ways that would undermine the very
price discovery that made exchanges attractive. By the time the 1960s
arrived, institutional investors had become the largest owners of equities—a
development in part aided by technological advances.93 This change in
equity ownership heightened the importance and costs of high
commissions. Because institutions traded large blocks of shares, the
commissions added up and were more concentrated. As institutions sought
ways to circumvent the fees and costs, several techniques became popular.
One of the most dominant approaches was to trade NYSE securities in the
OTC market, often with a non-NYSE member. Another was to trade shares
on a regional exchange.
The NYSE, seeing a potential threat to its liquidity, reacted to these
trading strategies in the form of Rule 394, later renamed Rule 390, which
prohibited NYSE members from executing trades in NYSE-listed securities
outside of the exchange.94 That way, the argument went, liquidity could be
maintained and not diluted. But it brought along the useful bonus of
allowing NYSE members to price gauge customers. Institutional investors
balked and complained to the SEC.
The SEC responded in 1968 by initiating a review of fixed commission
rates, which lasted nearly a decade.95 As a matter of policy, the NYSE’s
actions created a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, liquidity was indeed a
public good that was necessary for the price discovery process. At the same
time, the NYSE’s actions were patently anticompetitive and allowed the
members to extract monopoly rents from traders. With the second issue
ultimately outweighing the first, the SEC abolished fixed rates in 1975 and,
in the process, eased the economic incentives that were driving trading to
regional and OTC markets.96
Yet arguably the most remarkable aspect of the investigation is that it
would bring to light other less savory aspects of the market and the
increasing fragmentation of the market. As policymakers became more
familiar with the off-exchange trading generated by anticompetitive market
practices, both the SEC and Congress highlighted the need for a central
92. See id.
93. See supra Part I.B.2.
94. See SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 352.
95. See Robert L.D. Colby & Erik R. Sirri, Consolidation and Competition in the U.S.
Equity Markets, 5 CAP. MKT. L.J. 169, 180–81 (2010).
96. Id.
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market system for securities to maintain a robust and interconnected trading
environment.97 So along with the other legislative reforms, Congress
granted the SEC explicit authority to mandate a “national market system”
for the trading of securities and to protect the price discovery mechanism
necessary to support robust capital markets.98
Notably, this congressional writ did not resolve the issue of the proper
balance between consolidation and competition; rather, it suggested that the
SEC was to encourage both.99 With no clear instruction, the SEC’s
response was very much a compromise in which both policy objectives
were embraced. The SEC required NASD “to disseminate the best bid and
ask quotes made public on the floor of the exchanges and by significant
OTC market makers.”100 In this way, the purpose of transparency would be
advanced. But there were limits. The SEC did not, namely, require the
publication of all quotes, but instead obliged the dissemination of only the
best quote of each exchange and OTC market maker.101 Furthermore, the
SEC revised Rule 390 to permit NYSE members to route orders to the OTC
market where better prices were available and allowed them to make
markets in an expanding array of NYSE stocks, though “few members
availed themselves of these opportunities.”102 Instead, deep structural
changes in the NYSE’s market operations waited over two decades, during
which time other regulatory and technological changes rocked the industry.
II. DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY IN NEW FINANCE
The regulatory perimeter established by the Securities Act and Exchange
Act and their implementing rules would remain robust for nearly a half
century. This was in large measure due to the relative durability of the
market ecosystem of the time. In short, securities markets’ infrastructure
was not one prone to change, so the actors animating them could be
regulated with some degree of consistency. The NYSE in particular had
changed surprisingly little since its creation in 1792.103 Investors interested

97. See id. at 181.
98. See id. at 181–83.
99. See id. at 180–81.
100. Id. at 181.
101. See id. at 181–82.
102. Id. at 182. Member firms seeking to reduce the costs of executing customer order
flow could now route order flow to the third market, where listed stocks traded over the
counter, as well as to the floor of the NYSE. Hans R. Stoll, The Causes and Consequences of
the Rise in Third Market and Regional Trading, 19 J. CORP. L. 509, 510 (1994). Notably,
however, “the loosening of the fixed commission rate structure and the ultimate deregulation
of commissions in 1975” contributed to the decline of third-market trading “because
institutional investors, who had used the third market to avoid the NYSE’s fixed commission
rates, had less reason to trade away from the exchanges.” Mark Borrelli, Market Making in
the Electronic Age, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 815, 840 (2001).
103. Notably, this ecosystem was not even very far removed from the times in which the
NYSE was founded in 1792. Not far from coffee houses and offices of local traders who
invested their savings, “[t]rading at the NYSE took place on the floor of the
exchange . . . amid the haggling of a select group of insiders.” SCOTT PATTERSON, DARK
POOLS: HIGH-SPEED TRADERS, AI BANDITS, AND THE THREAT TO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
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in buying or selling securities placed orders with brokers on trading floors.
These orders comprised either “market orders,” which required the broker
to trade immediately at the best possible price, or “limit orders,” which
specified a maximum price if buying or a minimum price if selling. From
there, orders were executed on trading floors operated by the exchange.
The broker forwarded the order to the trading room of his brokerage house,
which then phoned the order to a clerk working on the exchange. In some
instances, the clerk then handed the order to a broker working on a floor,
who then walked the order to a post where a designated trader, “the
specialist,” acted as an auctioneer and, in many exchanges, as a market
maker for the securities.
Similarly, change came only incrementally to the trading of shares overthe-counter. As they had throughout the nineteenth century, retail investors
seeking to buy an unlisted stock could make a limit order for a particular
security with their broker. That broker would then decide to sell those
shares himself at the prices specified by the limit or market order (based on
assumptions or guesses relating to the prevailing price of the security) or,
alternatively, send that order to a kind of wholesale broker, known as a
“market maker,” who might develop a particular specialty in that security.
But, again, in contrast to the NYSE specialists, OTC market makers might
compete with one another to buy or sell particular securities.104
Technology would, above all else, merely upgrade the relationship among
the players by allowing faster communication, through telephones, that
accelerated the ability of intermediaries to gather (albeit incomplete) data
about the demand and price of a stock.105
As the late 1970s and 80s arrived, however, more change came to the
trading floors of America’s stock exchanges in the subsequent three decades
than in the previous two hundred years. As demonstrated in the following
sections, these changes not only came to redefine how markets operated
but, by extension, redefined the incentives and very structure of the U.S.
securities ecosystem. Not only did they enable the increasing automation in
financial services, but they also enabled the development of new private
capital markets that circumvented some of the traditional triggers of
comprehensive oversight accompanying public offerings.
A. Automated Financial Services
Technology has impacted the delivery of financial services in two key
ways. First, trading has evolved in ways in which human beings have
found themselves displaced by computers in the execution of trades.
Second, and even more profoundly, technological developments have

SYSTEM 68 (2012). And as in the 1970s, OTC trading was, at least in theory, a possibility.
Id. at 73 (“[I]nvestors could simply meet on the street and exchange stock certificates for
cold hard cash[,] . . . [and it] often occurred—on Broad Street itself (or its curb, which came
to be known as the Curb Market).”).
104. See INGEBRETSEN, supra note 41, at 21.
105. See id. at 21–22.

2015]

TECHNOLOGY AND SECURITIES REGULATION

999

enabled machines, rather than humans, to make the very decisions as to
what securities should be bought and sold by executing highly complicated
statistical analyses based on pre-set programming and directions.
1. Computerized Trading
The first major changes to the market ecosystem were tied to the advent
of computerized trading. Prior to computerized trading, “[f]inancial
information was disseminated slowly, usually by ticker tape, and telephonic
The trading environment was
communication was expensive.”106
consequently primitive: middlemen were not uncommonly inches from one
another on exchanges, allowing for the expeditious identification of
counterparties. Or they shouted quick orders to one another over the phone.
The pricing of orders, and their handling, was in turn highly inefficient.
Instead of relying on research or statistical departments to generate accurate
pricing data for securities, many broker-dealers focused on their incoming
orders to generate guesses about the market, and because orders were not
widely distributed, specialists and market makers imposed high bid-ask
spreads to generate exorbitant profits. Meanwhile, as was seen in the backoffice crisis that played out throughout the 1960s, orders for both OTC and
exchange-listed securities were poorly processed by overwhelmed market
intermediaries.107
In the mid-1970s, however, advances in computer processing allowed
new forms of trading and connectivity to arise among trading professionals.
Spurred in part by the SEC’s own acknowledgement of the need to
“automate” trading in the 1960s, early personal and desktop computers
were embraced by financiers in an effort to lend more structure to the
market.108 In 1966, a NASD Automation Committee was convened to help
create a system where a centralized computer could replace a floor and
allow dealer participants to quote prices for stocks.109 After a half decade
of work, the NASDAQ was created and boasted an electronic quotation
system that displayed orders from a previously dislocated network of
dealers. Over time, it became the world’s first electronic stock market110

106. Brummer, supra note 76, at 1458.
107. See INGEBRETSEN, supra note 41, at 50–51.
108. In a famous study conducted by the SEC entitled Special Study of the Securities
Markets, the SEC itself opined that it might one day be
technically feasible to use a central computer to record and report interdealer
quotations for some or all over-the-counter securities on a continuous basis. In
addition to providing a method for instantaneously determining best quotations,
such a system might provide wholly new means of matching buy and sell orders
and even accomplishing their executions in some circumstances.
Id. at 66 (quoting SEC, SPECIAL STUDY OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS 669 (1963)).
109. Id. at 77.
110. See NASDAQ’s Story, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaqomx.com/aboutus/companyinformation/timeline (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/JJS7-F3AY].
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and allowed dealers to compete in the provision of quotes for securities in
real time with one another.111
Meanwhile, the NYSE introduced its Designated Order Turnaround
(DOT) system, which electronically routed smaller market orders directly to
specialists.112 And in 1984, the DOT system became SuperDOT for its
ability to link financial firm members to trading specialists located at
trading posts on the trading floor.113 Akin to a Craigslist for stocks of the
1980s, the system operated as an electronic bulletin board for institutional
investors displaying a stock’s price. Orders showed up on an order display
book for specialists on the exchange to see at terminals on their
workstations. Later in 1984, NASDAQ established a similar system called
the Small Order Execution System (SOES) to allow brokers for small
investors trading less than one thousand shares to place orders directly with
market makers.114
That said, professional trade execution remained, for the most part, mired
in the nineteenth century. NYSE traders, as they had for years, continued to
scream out orders on trading floors and scribble numbers on scraps of paper
to keep records of their dealings.115 Hand signals indicated how many
shares they wanted to buy or sell, and the first to signal a trade won.116
Meanwhile,
most [NASDAQ] market makers traded over the phone or used a
computer system called SelectNet, which displayed bids and offers on a
screen and allowed traders to place orders through a window on their
terminals, much like a primitive instant message system. While [it ran]
on a computer network, SelectNet [did not] actually implement the trade.
It merely transmitted information about bids and offers to human market
makers, who executed the trades by hand.117

But the technological upgrades over time allowed for new kinds of profitmaking ventures that redefined how money could be made in the market.
Such profit-making opportunities became especially prevalent with the
advent of personal computing in the 1980s—and ushered in the first of what
is considered today to be “high speed” traders. With human beings still
responsible for inputting most trades by hand, traders who could connect to
actual trading platforms directly and execute trades by computer were able
to make orders to buy and sell faster than their competitors. The seminal
opportunity for technological upgrade came in 1986, when the NASDAQ
Workstation software was unveiled, which could be downloaded onto a

111. See Michael J. McGowan, The Rise of Computerized High Frequency Trading: Use
and Controversy, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 16, ¶ 13. Initially, however, NASDAQ was
prohibited from selling restricted shares and no attempts were made by the SEC at the time
to introduce more competition in the trading industry.
112. Id. ¶ 6.
113. Id.
114. INGEBRETSEN, supra note 41, at 101.
115. See PATTERSON, supra note 103, at 70.
116. See id.
117. Id. at 79.
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DOS-powered personal computer.118 The genius of the program is that it
enabled traders to create a customized list of stocks to follow and, equally
as important, to monitor market makers’ activity.119 Then, in 1994, another
leap forward was taken with the debut of the Workstation II, an open-source
platform that eventually opened channels for speedy traders to trade via
Enterprising
SOES and, later, opened other trading platforms.120
entrepreneurs could watch stock activity and execute trades via keystrokes
when they saw the market moving.121
Leveraging technology not only to access prices but also to execute
trades turned the sector inside out. By the early 1990s, speed no longer
meant absolute proximity to the trading floor. Traders with terminals and
the right market-surveillance software could beat longstanding incumbents
and insiders (i.e., dealers and specialists on the NYSE and market makers
on the NASDAQ) to the punch on trades from hundreds of miles away.
In this way, electronic trading presented the possibility of making money
off of the market makers and reversed the traditionally privileged position
market makers had vis-à-vis traders.122 In the case of the SOES system,
which was the first system infiltrated by high speed traders (who are now
called the SOES “bandits”), dealers and brokers who had dominated the
sale of a particular security were suddenly forced to become more diligent
about the markets they made and the prices they offered.123 A moment’s
lapse could expose the trader to a move by a bandit that exploited poorly
calculated spreads. In this way, speed arguably catalyzed more, not less,
market integrity and accuracy with regard to the minute-by-minute ticks of
the market.
2. Algorithms and Artificial Intelligence
For all of the advantages electronic trading brought to some smart
traders, computerization itself was only a prelude to arguably even larger
changes in the securities industry that would eventually take place. Another
decisive development, which continues to advance today, is the increasing
dependence on, and deployment of, computers and computer processing to
not only execute trades and collect market data but to also make
independent trading decisions.
Computer decisions are based on algorithms—set procedures and
functions—to program trading in such a way as to respond to new data
according to the pre-set objectives or functions of investors. These
algorithms are designed to deliver the highest return, or risk-adjusted return,
and define certain kinds of parameters to be included in the risk calculation.

118. INGEBRETSEN, supra note 41, at 81. Importantly, however, market makers who
received limit orders from clients were under no obligation to broadcast them. Id. at 145.
119. Id. at 81.
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 81–83.
123. See PATTERSON, supra note 103, at 81.
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For example, market liquidity, volatility, or other factors could be
introduced into the basic trade execution programming, and through these
analytic variables, an automated trade decision is made.124
By creating programs to respond instantaneously to new information,
algorithmic trading enables degrees of data analysis and execution speed
previously unattainable. Early on, traders would be able to simultaneously
analyze and compare the movements of not just three stocks or thirty, but
thousands, at a time, every second. And with time, traders developed ever
more complex execution models that attempted to maximize the objective
function established by programmers in more novel and advanced ways.
Programs not only calculate trades, and execute them in increasingly
elaborate manners, but also sift through data variables to identify the most
relevant inputs and to learn from the evolving movements or actions of
other market participants. Thus, over time, a range of different trades and
programs inhabited the market ecosystem. These are discussed below.
Trigger trades: At its simplest, algorithms can be employed in ways to
execute limit orders once basic thresholds are met.125 A trade trigger is
usually a market condition or a specified event, such as a rise or fall in the
price of a security. “For an investor looking to buy Public Company shares
at $10 dollars [sic] a share, an algorithm observes the market and sends a
purchase order as soon as the price reaches this figure.”126
Trigger trades represent profit-making opportunities in several ways. To
the extent to which a trader is first to pull the trigger, his or her trade is
more likely to be executed and executed before other traders can adjust
prices in response. Thus, fast execution can help enable trades of even
large blocks without distorting the price in ways that severely disadvantage
the trader pulling the trigger. Equally important, speed helps avoid the cost
of trade latency—namely the risk that the price of a security will rise before
an order can be made or that an offer or bid could be revoked before
securing an agreement. Finally, and most controversially, speed can enable
a trader to purchase and then resell a security at a higher price to
institutional investors trying to unload large blocks of securities.
Statistical arbitrageurs: More complex strategies involve leveraging
mathematical formulas and past historical data to identify mispricing of
stocks as they relate to one another. If, for example, two stocks in the same
sector tend to track one another closely, and if the spread between the two
falls out of historical means, a trader could program a computer to trade on
the under- or overpriced security, acting on the assumption that the
historical correlation is likely to continue and a reversion to the relationship
between the securities will occur.

124. See id. at 194–95 (describing specifically tradebot software for algo trading and
personal computers).
125. Yesha Yadav, Beyond Efficiency in Securities Regulation 26 (Vanderbilt Law &
Econ., Working Paper No. 14-8, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2400527 [http://perma.cc/8V6W-HXXE].
126. Id.
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To hide trades, new cloaking algo strategies were devised whereby
trades, especially buy orders, were broken up into their constituent pieces to
mask intentions to purchase large numbers of stock.127 Randomizing trade
strategies also were introduced to shift unexpectedly and adopt different
trade strategies to protect trades and help ensure best execution. To counter
these strategies, counterparties developed ever more complex order
awareness algos to detect trading strategies and hunt large market orders
like hunters following their prey. Once momentum or trading patterns were
detected, trigger trades would be executed in milliseconds to beat their
competition to the punch.
Execution arbitrage (the “size game” algorithm): Algorithms were used
to game order execution rules of the venues in which they operated. The
idea behind the algorithms was simple, even if the math was not. It also can
be demonstrated best by example. In the early 1990s, certain exchanges
were giving priority to firms that placed large orders, regardless of whether
they were ever executed.128 With this in mind, several twenty-something
traders developed various algorithm programs, the most famous being the
“Monster Key,” to send artificially inflated orders in order to get priority
and leap in front of the queue to match orders.129 By engaging in this risky,
albeit statistically sophisticated, manner of trading, traders could make a
ridiculous offer and still get the best price. This strategy, once discovered,
was then mimicked by others with names like “Bombs,” “Superbombs,”
“Guerillas,” “Stealths,” and “Snipers,” all to exploit the rules established by
the venues to increase the likelihood of execution.130
B. Private Capital Markets
Automated trading and execution were not the only developments to
transform the industry. Other changes would also roil markets as new
venues for trading proliferated, often with the help of regulatory
interventions. Namely, not only would securities be traded on more
markets outside the traditional exchange infrastructure, but a secondary
market for private placements would also be established.
1. Alternative Trading Venues
The impact of technology on the environment for securities issuances and
trading proved, after a period of initial gestation and experimentation
among market participants, to be profound. As the following sections
indicate, engineers and programmers developed new platforms to
accommodate electronic trading systems. New regulatory guidelines,
meanwhile, incentivized, and in some instances necessitated, greater

127. See KENDALL KIM, ELECTRONIC AND ALGORITHMIC TRADING TECHNOLOGY: THE
COMPLETE GUIDE 93 (2007).
128. See PATTERSON, supra note 103, at 94–95.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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computerization and specialization with regard to services intermediaries
provided.
a. From Island to Archipelago
The biggest limitation of artificial intelligence (AI) was that it did not
always jive well with human intelligence. Human beings—in all their
irrationality, impulsiveness, greed, and fear—were unpredictable and thus
did not interact well with computers, even though people programmed
them.131 Unlike computers, human beings made plenty of mistakes
inputting and executing orders, “upsetting the rigid computer-driven
systems, which depended on precise order.”132
This was a huge problem for early adopters of technology throughout the
1990s. Even with the incremental creation of electronic platforms and
trading systems, humans were still very much at the heart of trading. On
the NYSE, which dominated trading of blue-chip stocks such as IBM and
GE through floor specialists who monopolized the trading of a security, and
even on the NASDAQ, where roughly five hundred market makers
competed to offer the most attractive bids and offers of other stocks, trading
was for the most part done manually. A change was thus needed in the
form of new, sanitized markets to connect electronic (algorithmic) traders
and develop a new market ecosystem free of human interference.
To accommodate this demand, engineers and financiers began to develop
platforms to connect computerized trading systems. It was not an entirely
novel project. As Part II.A explained, since the mid-1980s, systems had
been in development to connect traders of small volumes directly to the
market. During this period, traders themselves recognized the advantages
(and profits) that could come from supercharging trading speeds.
Eventually, however, some of the most popular programs, specifically the
Watcher, began to generate sufficient volume, and operators recognized that
a valuable service could be made matching orders coming into their
system.133 That way, buy and sell orders could be connected internally and
thus avoid the commissions charged by the market makers on exchanges.
One of the most successful Datek traders, and creator of the Watcher,
designed a system where users could trade directly between themselves
without interacting with a market maker.134 From this system, the
electronic communication network (ECN) that would be known as “Island”
was launched in 1996.135 Island was innovative insofar as traders could
subscribe to their services and receive information on stocks through an
electronic feed. To promote the process and encourage trading, once trades
were booked, they were reported to the consolidated tape—a program
providing constantly updated information on trading volume and prices—
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 29.
Id.
Id. at 116.
See id. at 116–17.
See id.
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and then published for free on the Island website using a program called
Bookviewer.136 In providing the service, Island became known as one of
the first “lit” alternative trading venues for securities trading.137 Without
having to rely on humans for processing all aspects of their orders
manually, Island would set the stage for algorithmic trading to later grow,
adapt, mutate, and evolve.
During the same decade, a company known as “Instinet” would also
create a market-leading ECN.138 This ECN hosted entirely anonymous
trading among institutional investors and was facilitated through Instinet
hardware. Traders had to rent the computer for a modest fee of about
$1000 a month, and their firms needed to pass through a credit committee
that essentially only allowed the largest, most wealthy players to
participate.139 Computers would display buy and sell orders, though trades
were not reported to the public until after they were completed. Equally
“[i]mportant, the matching process wasn’t automated. Living, breathing
Instinet traders sitting at desks in Instinet’s midtown Manhattan
headquarters did the actual grunt work of bringing the buy and sell orders
together and settling the deal, usually through a few quick phone calls with
the institutions themselves.”140
Between the two, “Island quickly gained a reputation as having one of
the fastest ‘matching engines’—the computer system that links together buy
and sell orders—on Wall Street.”141 Almost immediately, more traders
began to migrate to its system, and as its popularity grew and more
transactions were consummated on its platform, it started taking market
share away from NSADAQ itself.142
With Island’s dominance, competitors regrouped to knock the firm off its
perch. One former SOES trader in particular, Jerry Putnam, recognized that
a potentially successful strategy to challenge Island would be to create an
ECN where trades were first routed there, and then if there was no match—
due to limited liquidity—a software program driven by advanced AI
infrastructure would assess the market and route the trade for its best match
elsewhere.143 From this pathbreaking idea, the “smart order router,” a
computerized system that watches and surveys the rest of the market for
trade matches, was born.144 In short, a new kind of network was
envisioned, one that could link “islands” of liquidity together: an

136. Id. at 119.
137. Id. at 118–19.
138. Id. at 110.
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. Scott Patterson, Man Vs. Machine: How the Crash of ‘87 Gave Birth to HighFrequency Trading, CNBC (Sept. 13, 2010, 4:47 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/39038914
[http://perma.cc/K5DT-SUT5].
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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“archipelago” of markets. In 1997, Putnam launched the Archipelago
ECN.145
Archipelago prospered and grew with the help of investment banks like
Goldman Sachs who were actively funneling orders into its system.146 The
firm’s savvy move to link pools of liquidity provided new levels of
assurance that orders could and would be executed. Island, too, continued
to eat into NASDAQ’s market share as a steady flow of traders began
entering the market on the heels of the internet bubble.147 By 1998, Island
managed to capture one-tenth of the volume of all NASDAQ stocks and
had established itself as the top NASDAQ dealer of premium internet
stocks, such as Yahoo! and Amazon.148
b. Order Handling and Decimalization
Yet the major drivers of ECN growth came not only from technological
innovation, but from novel rulemaking as well. By 1997, evidence had
been presented showing that market makers ignored odd-eighth quotes.149
That is, instead of making bids in one-eighth increments, dealers quoted
prices in one-half or three-quarter increments, suggesting a coordinated
attempt to keep the bid-ask spread wide (and earn outsized profits).150 In
response to the scandal, which belied considerable market manipulation, in
1997 the SEC passed new “Order Handling Rules” that required exchange
specialists and OTC market makers to publicly display customer limit
orders (again, orders to buy or sell at a specific price) when the orders were
better than the quotes offered by the specialist or market maker.151 In that
way, the investing public could compete directly in the price discovery
process and for transactions. Specialists and market makers could still trade
at better prices in the ECNs without publishing an improved quote, but the
ECN would have to eventually publish the improved prices and make them
available to the investing public.
The idea behind the rules, which in many respects created the legal
category of an ECN, was in part to bring Instinet trades to the light. But it
had the side effect of essentially mandating that bids and offers for stocks
on ECNs be displayed on terminals right beside those of the NASDAQ
market makers.152 By opening up the market in this way, the playing field
for the entire secondary market was leveled. Electronic systems like Island
could suddenly compete head-to-head with investment banks and the
exchanges. And large dealers like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See PATTERSON, supra note 103, at 152–53.
148. See id.
149. See generally William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz, Why Do NASDAQ Market
Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth Quotes?, 49 J. FIN. 1813 (1994) (finding evidence that traders
avoid using odd-eighth quotes and suggesting collusion as an explanation).
150. See Colby & Sirri, supra note 95, at 184.
151. Patterson, supra note 141.
152. Id.
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now had to keep apprised of ECN markets as the dealer choke hold over
order flow was cracked.153 Technology became critical for processing the
data, and home-based systems were quickly being replaced by screen-based
networks.154 Concomitantly, AI was used not only to execute but also to
drive the trading process forward.
At the same time, the SEC regulated the new market venues with a
markedly light touch. Although ECNs were poised to grow in importance,
they were not regulated as exchanges. Instead, under Regulation ATS155
and Rule 3b-18,156 they could avoid registration with the Commission, as
well as the securities registration requirements, self-regulatory obligations,
and other restrictions on institutional members’ exchange registration.157
The primary condition was that they were operated by a broker-dealer, were
not the dominant market for the trading of the security, and did not use the
word “exchange” in their name.158
Another catalyst driving electronic trading forward came in 2000 with
“decimalization,” which required that stocks be traded in penny increments
instead of fractions of a dollar.159 With decimalization, stocks could trade
in more diverse increments, generating more computational complexity
better tackled by computers than the human brain.160 Moreover, penny
increments sliced prevailing bid-ask spreads, forcing many established
market makers to close shop—and opening up opportunities for hyperefficient, high-speed firms that could do more work and handle greater
volumes to stay in the black.161
Arguably the most important development arose when Rule 390 was
repealed. As noted in the discussion above, Rule 390 prevented NYSElisted companies from engaging in off-floor transactions.162 In 2001,
however, after a series of public criticisms by SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt,
the rule was effectively dismantled, and stocks listed on the NYSE, regional
exchanges, and the Chicago Board Options exchange were freely tradable
in the OTC markets.163 This in turn released enormous pressure on the
NYSE to compete with other more technologically advanced trading venues
that could—and did—appeal to traders and nonmembers.164
Collectively, these developments reshaped the industry of exchange
trading as exchanges’ market share decreased alongside commissions. The
competition eventually forced exchanges to adapt for the sake of their own
survival. The most dramatic move came in 2005. On April 20, John Thain,
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
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See Colby & Sirri, supra note 95, at 183–84.
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See id. at 184–85.
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the CEO of the NYSE, announced alongside archrival Archipelago CEO
Putnam that the two firms would merge and that the new exchange would
promote a hybrid market that integrated into one platform both an auction
and automated market.165 Additionally, the firm would be publicly traded,
instead of member owned.166 By merging, it was hoped that the NYSE
would win front-end technology, an experienced staff capable of running it,
and entrepreneurial management.167 Public ownership offering would
meanwhile focus the firm on becoming as competitive and useful for traders
and investors as for the exchange members who traditionally manipulated
its rules for their benefit. Two days later, on April 22, 2005, NASDAQ
announced a definitive agreement to purchase another large ECN, Instinet
Group Incorporated, and in the process acquire Inet—a large ECN that
traded 25 percent of the NASDAQ listed volume daily—and use its
technology to help save costs and upgrade its systems.168 Between the two
transactions, the matching engine at NASDAQ became essentially the same
one created in the early 1990s by early SOES traders, just as the NYSE’s
platform was that of the ECN Arca.169
c. Regulation NMS
Inevitably, one outcome of the technological one-upmanship was market
specialization as ECNs began to proliferate. Some catered to high
frequency traders and provided an ideal environment for them to weave in
and out of their markets—and thus boasted high levels of liquidity. Others,
in contrast, would eventually seek to replicate and build off of Instinet’s
attempts to create high frequency trading (HFT)—free, anonymous “dark
pools” of capital. The idea was that, by shifting trades into the shadows,
they could allow institutional investors to trade large blocks of stocks
without moving the market.170 Meanwhile, established exchanges began to
fight more deliberately for order flow by upgrading their platforms and
changing the business models that had guided them for over two hundred
years.
Not surprisingly, however, with competition, trading became
decentralized and fewer market participants coalesced around the same
venues to trade. This development in turn created market fragmentation, to
the consternation of many policymakers and market participants. For one,
regulators and economists began to worry that with fewer market
participants interacting with one another in any one particular place, prices
would respond more slowly to new information, creating longer periods in

165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 47.
168. See id. at 48.
169. See Patterson, supra note 141.
170. Such a strategy would in effect end up mimicking the so-called “fourth market”
where investors trade with one another. Polly Nyquist, Failure to Engage: The Regulation
of Proprietary Trading Systems, 13 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 281, 288–89 (1995).
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which market prices were out of alignment with their “real” equilibrium
price.171 It also meant that infrastructure providers might not route trades to
the venues that offered the best execution. Fragmentation also enabled a
free rider problem to the extent that market participants operating via ECNs
executed trades based on the market price generated and displayed by lit
public venues.172 Because publicly generated information often fueled
trading, ECNs’ business models relied at least in part on participants
skimming the price information generated (and subsidized) by exchanges,
though exchanges were not compensated for the information they
generated.
With these concerns in mind, the SEC promulgated Regulation NMS in
2007 to better coordinate markets.173 Under the regulation, any investor’s
instructions to buy or sell a stock had to be diverted to the venue that
displayed the best price.174 If an investor placed a limit order to buy
Twitter on the NASDAQ, where it was selling for $41.22, and the
investor’s broker, a NASDAQ market maker, discovered there was a better
price on Archipelago for $42, then he had to be routed to Archipelago.
Though the rules made intuitive sense, they unleashed yet another series
of new pressures to ensure technological competitiveness. One element of
the rule, the so-called trade-through rule, allowed firms to trade through
human-controlled manual markets if they were too slow in processing
orders.175 Furthermore, trading venues would have to constantly monitor
the price of the stock on every trading venue, all the time, a feat beyond the
capacity of the mind.176 Together, these new developments would make
the use of industrial-strength computerized trading and execution a practical
necessity.177
But there were also a number of complications. Because prices were still
the dominant component of trading decisions, any fluctuation in prices, no
matter how minuscule, could result in an order being rejected or diverted to
another venue. Or a firm could find itself with what it thought was a highly
competitive bid one minute, and kicked to the back of the queue of
incoming orders the next.178 This raised risks of bad execution for HFTs,
now the dominant source of liquidity, and could undermine the
attractiveness of venues seeking their business.
Some venues responded to their technology-wielding (and feegenerating) customers by, among other things, rolling out new order types
called “sitting duck limit orders” that allowed high-frequency traders who
171. Mark Klock, The SEC’s New Regulation ATS: Placing the Myth of Market
Fragmentation Ahead of Economic Theory and Evidence, 51 FLA. L. REV. 753, 777 (1999).
172. See id. at 781.
173. Regulation NMS, SEC Release No. 34-51808, 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 201, 230, 240,
242, 249, 270 (June 9, 2005), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-51808.pdf [http://perma.
cc/8FMD-DGCB].
174. See Nyquist, supra note 170, at 292–93.
175. PATTERSON, supra note 103, at 239.
176. Id. at 49.
177. Id. at 239–40.
178. See id. at 49.
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posted orders to remain hidden at a specific price point at the front of the
trading line when the market was moving.179 Through the orders, traders
could sideline typical limit orders made by slower institutional investors
like mutual funds and pensions. And to sweeten the incentives to trade,
they created rules allowing HFTs to make other firms pay a “take” fee for
using the liquidity they were “making.” Thus, in providing the special
orders for privileged traders, exchanges were allowing, and even helping,
firms circumvent Regulation NMS by creating a secret “dark pool inside the
lit pool.”180 Meanwhile, other ECNs resorted to slashing their commissions
with the result that their bottom line would take a direct hit—all with the
goal of becoming more attractive for a host of new competitors coming of
age in the wake of the order-handling rules like BRUT, Sigma X, and BTrade.181
Through such episodic forms, the SEC’s Regulation NMS, when
combined with the order-handling rules and regulation alternative trading
systems (ATS), facilitated a patchwork of regulations aimed at balancing
competition and price discovery. Exchanges, significant OTC market
makers, and ATS with more than 5 percent of the volume in a security
would have to display their best bid and offers; broker-dealers would also
have to report all trades, block or non-block, within thirty seconds.182
Trading centers additionally had to publish statistics to show what quality
of markets they were providing training centers and were prohibited from
trading at inferior prices to the best quote published by other electronic
trading centers.183 Meanwhile, broker-dealers were subject to increasingly
stringent best execution requirements and obligated to disclose which
trading centers they used to route their orders.184
The market impact was, and continues to be, dramatic. As discussed
above, all U.S. exchanges have become primarily electronic, a development
that has boosted trading volume and is squeezing commissions on a per
trade basis. At the same time, the fragmentation has given traders an
expanded array of venues as to where and how to execute their trades, a
topic this Article returns to below. Suffice it to say, for the moment, not
only have electronic traders found and identified ecosystems that have
suited their infrastructure needs, but institutional investors themselves also
have used the fragmented ecosystem to execute even large trades in ways
that do not necessarily move markets by filling them in smaller venues
where quotes are not required to be published.

179. See id. at 50. Varying forms of queue-jumping programs were reportedly embedded
in maker-taker functionality models marketed to select high frequency traders to additionally
enable execution on favorable terms. Stanislav Dolgopolov, The Maker-Taker Pricing Model
and Its Impact on the Securities Market Structure: A Can of Worms for Securities Fraud?, 8
VA. L. & BUS. REV. 231, 259 (2014).
180. PATTERSON, supra note 103, at 50.
181. See Dolgopolov, supra note 179, at 244–46.
182. See Colby & Sirri, supra note 95, at 182.
183. See id. at 184–85.
184. See id. at 185.
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2. Rule 144A Trading Platforms
Many of the brokerages that had been participating in the migration away
from exchanges realized that similar opportunities potentially existed in the
private placement market. Just as algo traders needed private, volume-rich
markets to sell and interact, issuers of securities increasingly sought pools
of liquidity for their stocks and bonds where institutional traders could
meet, off exchange, in order to avoid triggering Exchange Act reporting
obligations.
The prospect of a secondary market for private placements was not novel,
but was nonetheless riveting. As mentioned above in Part I, the broadest
exemption to the section 5 registration requirement was section 4(2), which
exempted transactions “not involving any public offering.”185 But at the
time of the New Deal, and for decades following it, just what was required
to meet that threshold was ambiguous,186 and if for whatever reason an
issuer failed to comply with all the dictates of section 4(2), they would find
themselves faced with rescission liability under section 12 of the Exchange
Act. Only in the course of nearly forty years of case law, which worked to
articulate standards for private placements, and the promulgation of
Regulation D in 1982, which sculpted out three relatively clear paths for
avoiding exemption under the Securities Act,187 was sufficient comfort
made available to incentivize issuers to expend more time investigating the
prospects of nonpublic offerings.
Yet even then, more legal reforms were needed to facilitate a secondary
market. The beauty of Regulation D was that it opened up a number of
ways for companies to raise capital without going public. Rule 504, for
example, permits general solicitations and unregistered offerings up to $1
million,188 and Rule 505 enabled fundraisings of $5 million, though
prohibited public marketing.189 Most critical, however, was Rule 506,
which opened a pathway for companies to issue an unlimited amount of
securities to “accredited investors”—essentially investors earning more than
$200,000 a year or with a net worth greater than $1 million—so long as
they did not market the transaction to the public.190 But there were still
plenty of regulatory hurdles. Investors could invest in private securities,
though they could not legally resell them without risking running afoul of

185. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2012).
186. See Letter of General Counsel, supra note 33. Notably, no instruction was given as
to how to weigh the varying factors that might indicate whether an offering qualified for an
exemption, or whether and to what degree other factors were relevant. See id.
187. For an overview of Regulation D and Rules 504, 505 and 506, see Fast Answers,
SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/regd.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/
8AQW-95LP].
188. See Exemption for Limited Offerings and Sales of Securities Not Exceeding
$1,000,000, 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2013).
189. See Exemption for Limited Offers and Sales of Securities Not Exceeding
$5,000,000, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505.
190. See Definitions and Terms Used in Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)–(6)
(2012) (defining accredited investors).
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section 4(2) and likewise violating the Securities Act. As with the original
section 4(2) exemptions, various means of reselling were often ambiguous
and required cobbling together doctrines from the Securities Act in ways
that were not always clear and thus raised concerns among institutions. The
cost of raising capital under private placements was therefore still high
since securities that were issued, even under Regulation D, were for the
most part immobile and traded only with considerable difficulty.
The real revolution came about with Rule 144A in 1994, which would
liberalize trading by institutional investors (referred to as “qualified
institutional buyers” or “QIBs”) of securities that were privately placed.191
Specifically, Rule 144A would enable securities acquired pursuant to
Regulation D (or other Rule 144A transactions) to be sold to other
institutions (generally with $10 million under management) with no holding
period imposed and minimal disclosure requirements.192
Even today, the impact of Rule 144A is hard to overstate. For the half
century following the Exchange Act and well past the promulgation of
Regulation D, the trading of private placements—to the extent to which it
was even possible given what had been lengthy holding periods and legal
risk when the “restricted securities” were traded—had been facilitated like
any other over-the-counter securities—via a network of brokers and dealers
reliant on phone lines, gossip, and hot tips. Rule 144A would change this
significantly. Although issuances would still lack the market infrastructure
found in public markets, Rule 144A would reshape capital markets by
enabling more flexible fundraising and trading capabilities for institutional
investors. Firms could raise capital, free of most substantive requirements
(though notably Rule 10b-5 antifraud provisions would still be in effect),
and sell their securities to well-heeled institutional investors. Institutional
investors, meanwhile, could then trade the securities among one another.
With channels now wide open, capital markets would be reshaped. Indeed,
by 2006, America raised more money, $162 billion, from private investors
than from IPOs, from which $154 billion was raised from the three major
stock exchanges at the time.

191. See Private Resales of Securities to Institutions, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1)(i).
192. Id.§ 230.144A(a)(1)(ii).
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Figure 1193

The only thing missing was a platform for connecting buyers and sellers
of privately placed securities—in short, an off-exchange venue where the
purchase and sale of private securities could coalesce without triggering
registration requirements and the quarterly and annual disclosure
requirements that accompanied it. With this in mind, in 2007, at the height
of the housing bubble and the 144A market, several companies entered the
race to create a private exchange for private placements. In 2007, Goldman
Sachs started its own marketplace naming it “the Goldman Sachs Tradable
Unregistered Equity platform,” or GSTrUE.194 The idea, as Lloyd C.
Blankfein, the Goldman CEO, would argue, was to bring “the liquidity of
an exchange with the flexibility of a private placement.”195 The venture
would attract, most spectacularly, Oaktree Management and Apollo Global
Management, which both raised over $700 million on the network.196
Similarly, the NASDAQ exchange also entered the fray with a new
platform, called “the Portal Market,” and planned to host nearly 500
different firms on its network.197 Major investment banks, including

193. This figure was created with the help of librarians at the Georgetown Law Library.
The IPO data used in this figure was gathered from a researcher’s website who compiled that
information. See Jay. R. Ritter, IPO Data, WARRINGTON C. OF BUS., http://bear.warrington.
ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/7AWJ-DLEL]. In
addition, the IPO and 144A data were drawn from Bloomberg Law.
194. Peter Lattman, Private Goldman Exchange Officially Closes for Business, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 12, 2012, 5:09 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/12/private-goldmanexchange-officially-closes-for-business/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0
[http://perma.cc/
2QD4-VKPK].
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See Elena Schwieger, Redefining the Private Placement Market After SarbanesOxley: NASDAQ’s Portal and Rule 144A, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 885, 888 (2008).
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Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Citigroup began to set up their own
competing exchanges. With Portal in particular, which would be the largest
venue, investors would be able to log on to a secure website to access data
relating to the firms and then trade shares on a secure server. Prices, as on
any other electronic communications network, could then be updated
automatically.
There was, however, one enormous stumbling block: an absence of
people interested in trading on the private exchanges. Investors who
purchased shares of Apollo and Oaktree on GSTrUE “found few, if any,
buyers, for their stock when they wanted to sell.”198 Part of GSTrUE’s
woes stemmed from the problem that credit markets froze up at the same
time the platform was launched. Then, as Lehman failed, the financial
crisis gripped global markets, and “investors became allergic to any
investment where liquidity was an issue.”199 As a result, investors in
Apollo and Oaktree suffered steep losses as shares changed hands only at a
“steep discount to their true value.”200 Eventually, GSTrUE and all of the
first-generation firms vying to run private exchanges closed shop.
The retreat, however, proved only to be a tactical one. Eight years later,
engineers were busy trying to think through a more palatable platform for
the post-recession environment. One firm, SecondMarket, which was
originally founded in 2004 to create a liquidity platform for restricted
securities, diversified its business strategy in the wake of the crisis to also
service liquidity needs of distressed or illiquid assets including bankruptcy
claims, limited partnership interests, structured products (MBS, CDO,
ABS), and Bitcoin.201
Then, more spectacularly in 2013, NASDAQ (now called NASDAQ
OMX) reentered the 144A market alongside SharesPost—a firm that
allowed investors to swap shares of private companies for cash—to launch
a new marketplace for trading shares in privately held companies.202 As
was the case a decade earlier with Portal, part of the venture’s appeal was
allowing investors to buy into young and promising capital-hungry firms.
But this time, instead of developing its platform by itself, NASDAQ
leveraged SharesPost’s website, technology, and relationships with Silicon
Valley to launch a joint venture.

198. Lattman, supra note 194.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See Rory Maher, How Can Twitter and Facebook Employees Cash Out Now;
SecondMarket Offers New Marketplace, GIGAOM (Apr. 23, 2009, 1:15 PM),
http://gigaom.com/2009/04/23/419-how-can-twitter-and-facebook-employees-cash-out-now/
[http://perma.cc/JS22-K6DF].
202. See Aman Shah, NASDAQ, SharesPost to Set Up Market for Unlisted Stocks,
REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2013, 9:52 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/06/us-nasdaqsharespost-idUSBRE9250KT20130306 [http://perma.cc/JND6-MEE9]; cf. About Us,
NASDAQ PRIVATE MARKET, https://www.nasdaqprivatemarket.com/about-us (last visited
Nov. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/DY4X-3L9A].
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Business strategies are continuously changing as well.203 In contrast to
Portal, the joint venture reportedly offered companies a greater degree of
authority over a range of offering-related matters, even as they pertain to
the secondary market: “who can buy and sell, how much equity and cash
changes hands, and even the timing of trades”—a feature that competitor
SecondMarket has similarly imported into its own growing platform.204 In
that way, listing companies will enjoy more comfort as to the ownership of
their shares and will be able to more effectively craft appropriate market
signals to accredited investors and QIBs about their securities. Meanwhile,
to reduce the likely considerable impact such restrictions would have on the
liquidity of private issuances, the leveraging of a website instead of a
closed-end platform potentially allows issuers to utilize new JOBS Act205
reforms (elaborated in the following section) to generally solicit investors to
create a larger funding base. If successful, the new market could create a
self-sustaining secondary exchange for smaller, entrepreneurial companies,
or a bridge for early stage companies that might eventually list on a major
exchange. The prospect of such an account has indeed only increased with
an announcement by NASDAQ in October 2015 of its intent to purchase
the company.206
3. From Crowdfunding to Crowd Investing
The same JOBS Act that provided the legal basis for expanding the 144A
market also had an important impact on crowdfunding and triggered an
explosion in web-based innovation and financial products for the young
sector.
The definition of “crowdfunding” has been subject to some dispute, but
traditionally the term has referred to methods by which entrepreneurs
collect small contributions via an online interface to finance or capitalize
their ventures.207 As a financing venture, its origins lie as much in banking

203. See J. O’Dell, Is NASDAQ’s New Private Market the Exchange’s Last Hope in a
Web-Driven World?, VENTURE BEAT (Mar. 6, 2013, 12:01 PM), http://venturebeat.
com/2013/03/06/nasdaq-private-market-analysis/ [http://perma.cc/BQA5-FE3G].
204. Id.
205. See infra note 226 and accompanying text.
206. Kaja Whitehouse, NASDAQ Buys Secondmarket As Hot Companies Stay Private
Longer, USA TODAY (Oct. 22, 2015, 2:47 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/
2015/10/22/nasdaq-buys-secondmarket-hot-companies-stay-private-longer/74402134/
[http://perma.cc/8UZY-4UNZ].
207. As a legal matter, under the federal securities laws, crowdfunding denotes the offer
or sale of securities pursuant to the specified crowdfunding exemption established by section
4(a)(6) of the Securities Act. As a practical matter, however, “crowdfunding” is largely a
term of art and refers generically to the method of raising capital by acquiring small amounts
of capital directly from individual investors, typically via a publicly accessible online
platform, in exchange for a specified reward. Crowd investing, meanwhile, is often used
among market participants to denote crowdfunding programs where investors acquire equity
in the venture. See Tanya Prive, What Is Crowdfunding and How Does It Benefit the
Economy, FORBES (Nov. 27, 2012, 10:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/
11/27/what-is-crowdfunding-and-how-does-it-benefit-the-economy/ [http://perma.cc/B6JRU4XN].
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as they do in securities. In 1976, Muhammad Yunus lent $27 to forty-two
women to make bamboo furniture.208 The idea was to create new
opportunities for the poor by giving entrepreneurs access to banking
services and products that had until that time been foreclosed to them.209
After recuperating his capital, and demonstrating the safety of mini-loans to
the poor, Yunus secured capital from central banks and foundations to
extend the project to others.210 Within five years, the program had over
30,000 members, from which the Nobel Prize-winning Grameen Bank was
born.211
The revolution in what would be called “microlending” or
“microfinance” met the internet age three decades later. In 2005, Kiva.org
launched the first microlending website.212 By uploading profiles and
pictures of potential loan recipients, it globalized Yunus’s original concept.
It also reduced the informational asymmetries that naturally accompanied
global finance. Lenders could identify (often personally) with borrowers,
consider their business plan, and evaluate repayment in real time. In this
way, finance operated via increasingly commonplace social media
technology—which required far less expertise and coding than the ECNs
and dark pools required to facilitate HFT—to generate interest in smallscale entrepreneurial activities taking place all over the world.213 The
concept was quickly replicated in 2006, when Prosper.com launched the
first peer-to-peer lending site in the United States and took the
unprecedented step of offering loans, often below bank rates, to
entrepreneurs not in only developing countries, but in the United States as
well.214
The evolutionary leap from bank to securities finance arose circuitously.
In 2009, Kickstarter launched as a new way to fund creativity.215 The
company, alongside commentator Michael Sullivan, also helped coin the

208. See Stefan Lovgren, Nobel Peace Prize Goes to Micro-Loan Pioneers, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (Oct. 13, 2006), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2006/10/
061013-nobel-peace.html [http://perma.cc/J648-TNMY].
209. See Muhammad Yunus, Grameen Bank, Microcredit and Millennium Development
Goals, 39 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 4077, 4077 (2004).
210. See id.
211. See Crowdfunding History, FUNDABLE, https://www.fundable.com/learn/resources/
guides/crowdfunding-guide/crowdfunding-history (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) [http://perma.
cc/798L-WGLM].
212. See Press Release, Kiva, Kiva.org Merges Philanthropy and Venture Capital with
First-Ever Microlending Web Site (Oct. 12, 2005), http://www.kiva.org/press/releases/
release_20130114-15 [http://perma.cc/6L6F-HYB7].
213. See Emily Maltby, Tapping the Crowd for Funds: Entrepreneurs Reach Out to
Investors Through Social Networks, Sites for Capital, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 8, 2010, 12:01
AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274870349350457600746379697
7774 [http://perma.cc/HT4Y-SN44].
214. See Institutional Investment Through Prosper, PROSPER, https://www.prosper.com/
about/institutional/institutions/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/LG68-LZC6].
215. See Yancey Strickler, How Was the First Year of Kickstarter?, FORBES (Feb. 3,
2014, 12:31 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2014/02/03/how-was-the-first-year-ofkickstarter/ [http://perma.cc/G44T-CGKG].
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term of “crowdfunding.”216 Taking this concept as part of its brand,
Kickstarter initiated a means of finance whereby young entrepreneurs
would receive funding.217 Contributors would not, however, receive cash
back, much less interest.218 Instead, contributors become eligible for a
range of “rewards” ranging from video games to apps or whatever else the
recipient of the funds is making or striving to create.219 Notably, doing so
allowed participants on the webpage, and especially entrepreneurs, to avoid
falling within the definition of selling “securities” because contributors
were not looking for a “profit” in the traditional sense.220 They were not
entirely altruistic for sure, as they usually received something in return for
their contributions, but because they were not investing their money for
capital returns, the transactions fell well outside of the traditional meaning
of a security (or, more relevantly, an “investment contract”) as defined
under U.S. case law.221 Because there were no dealings in securities,
section 5 could not apply.
The prospect of securities-based crowdfunding was, however, of
increasing interest to both Wall Street and entrepreneurs. In short, the
technology that enabled peer-to-peer (donation-based) lending could be a
powerful tool for enabling securities transactions as well. In that way,
people could be free to donate, or seek perks, but they also could invest in
early-stage ventures.
Several important roadblocks, however, were in the way. Most notably,
once traditional securities transactions were married with internet
technology, investors would be seeking “profits” and, by extension, capital
returns, thus triggering section 5. Consequently, they would be subject to
registration and disclosure obligations under the Securities Act222 (and
subsequent reporting requirements under the Exchange Act223).
Furthermore, exemptions were of limited help. Regulation D and Rule
144A were of little use on the internet as advertisements about securities
constitute a “general solicitation”—which was banned for private
placements (and the reason why much of the activity had been routed to

216. See Daniela Castrataro, A Social History of Crowdfunding, SOC. MEDIA WK. (Dec.
12,
2011),
http://socialmediaweek.org/blog/2011/12/a-social-history-of-crowdfunding/
[http://perma.cc/6YSP-K8XS].
217. See Chance Barnett, Donation-Based Crowdfunding Sites:
Kickstarter Vs.
Indiegogo, FORBES (Sept. 9, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/
2013/09/09/donation-based-crowdfunding-sites-kickstarter-vs-indiegogo/ [http://perma.cc/
XCB6-YKJS].
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) (defining an investment contract
to comprise an investment of money, with an expectation of profits arising from a common
enterprise which depends solely on the efforts of others to determine if an investment is a
security).
222. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a)–(mm) (2012).
223. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)–(kk).

1018

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

brokerages and private exchanges).224 Instead, several websites, beginning
with AngelList in 2010, developed exclusive, closed-end accredited
investor websites that allowed qualifying investors to invest capital
alongside prominent angel investors in capital-hungry startups.225 As such,
however, AngelList’s reach was far more circumscribed than Prosper’s or
Kickstarter’s.
These web applications presented, above all else,
administrative ease and a user-friendly experience for investors seeking to
put capital toward attractive early-stage companies. Moreover, from the
standpoint of many crowdfunding champions, even successful 144A
issuances had the impact of locking out the retail public from opportunities
to invest in early-stage companies.
Ultimately, regulatory reform, not technology, provided the most radical
potential for reshaping the sector. In the wake of a failing banking system
and plummeting interbank lending, President Barack Obama signed the
JOBS Act into law to increase sources of finance for young businesses.226
Its implications were significant across private markets, which this Article
returns to below, but three in particular promise to hold an enormous impact
on the crowdfunding sector in particular.
The JOBS Act is best known for Title III.227 Under the rules laid out in
the legislation, individuals are no longer constrained to the donation-based
Instead,
crowdfunding models like Kickstarter and Indiegogo.228
congressional reforms authorized, and subsequent SEC rules proposed, that
a company could raise up to $1 million within a twelve-month period from
the general public through a website overseen by a broker-dealer or a lightly
regulated website called a “funding portal.”229 Investors, meanwhile, are
subject to annual investment caps based on their income or wealth, and
there are investor education requirements, as well as limits on general
advertising.230 Via these reforms, the U.S. Congress opened the door to
build out a new technological gateway for investing, built not so much on
traditional investor protections of disclosure, but instead on prudential

224. Definitions and Terms Used in Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (2012); Private
Resales of Securities to Institutions, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2014).
225. See Brad Stone, AngelList, the Social Network for Startups, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan.
16, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-01-16/angellist-the-social-networkfor-startups [http://perma.cc/9B4U-ECDK]; cf. Tanya Prive, Angel Investors: How the Rich
Invest, FORBES (Mar. 12, 2013, 9:27 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
tanyaprive/2013/03/12/angels-investors-how-the-rich-invest/ (discussing generally angel
investors) [http://perma.cc/RU3C-EADU].
226. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
227. See id. §§ 301–05; Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249).
228. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,429.
229. See Noam Noked, Regulation A+ Offerings—A New Era at the SEC, HARV. L. SCH.
F. oN CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 15, 2014), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/2014/01/15/regulation-a-offerings-a-new-era-at-the-sec/ [http://perma.cc/4DSB-5V
9D].
230. See Chris Brummer & Daniel Gorfine, The JOBS Act Isn’t All “Crowdfunding”,
FORBES (Oct. 8, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/10/08/the-jobsact-isnt-all-crowdfunding/ [http://perma.cc/VG6Q-J889].
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limitations on the amount of exposure to which any investor could be
exposed.
That said, arguably the most important role for crowd investing writ large
is Title II of the JOBS Act.231 This second part of the JOBS Act lifted the
ban for general solicitations under Rule 505 and 506 transactions so long as
the issuer reasonably believes, and has taken reasonable steps to verify that,
the buyers of the private securities are accredited.232 Through these
reforms, Congress not only enabled the growth of 144A issuances as a
general matter by removing a major impediment to their marketing of 144A
securities, but also encouraged the growth of web-based marketing and
social media campaigns through portals and (even more likely) registered
broker-dealers. Not surprisingly, the rules themselves have unleashed a
range of innovation among web service providers that offer dataverification programs for administrators of 144A campaigns to ensure high
quality disclosures and appropriate investor accreditation.233
A third and closely related set of reforms is Title IV, commonly known
as “the Regulation A+ reforms.”234 In this title, an earlier exemption for
securities offerings, Regulation A, has been revamped to become more
attractive to issuers. Regulation A’s “mini-registration” process permitted
the sale of securities to both accredited and unaccredited investors so long
as the issuer filed a mini-registration with the SEC and complied with
relevant state law requirements in each state where funds were solicited.
But it was of limited use as only $5 million could be raised, and the process
still involved both unclear and costly compliance procedures with varying
securities regulators. Few if any issuers besides Fundrise, a real estate firm,
used this exemption to raise money from investors in Washington, D.C.,
and Virginia for a local commercial real estate project.235 Title IV of the
JOBS Act, which increases the offering limit from $5 million to up to $50

231. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201, 126 Stat. 306
(2012); Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in
Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771 (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 242); Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, 78 Fed.
Reg. 44,806 (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239); Eliminating the
Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule
144A Offerings, 77 Fed. Reg. 54,464 (Sept. 5, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230,
239).
232. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in
Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,772 (July 4, 2013) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 242).
233. Crowdcheck, for example, helps platforms comply with investor protection
obligations by providing investors with clear and easy to understand information about the
companies on online platforms. See About Us, CROWDCHECK, http://www.crowdcheck.com/
about-us (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/4GTZ-5Z6G].
234. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act §§ 401–02 (adding § 3(b)(2)(D) to the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (2012)).
235. See The Fundrise Story, FUNDRISE, https://fundrise.com/about?source=main-menu#
story (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/PN7T-W2YH].
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million in a twelve-month period, requires that certain filings be provided to
investors and provides for annual audited financial statements.236
III. HOW TECHNOLOGY DISRUPTS REGULATORY PRACTICE
The technological innovation described above, though arising in diverse
market contexts, has three important implications for the practice of
securities regulation: First, technological innovation is increasingly
disintermediating public companies, and the need to go public, for
financing purposes. Second, exchanges are finding themselves increasingly
pushed to the side as venues for secondary trading and even listing. Finally,
and more complexly, the traditional dominance of exchange-based brokerdealers, like specialists and floor brokers, has given way to a new breed of
financial intermediaries that increasingly provide both venues and liquidity
for securities trading. In each case, the disruption of regulatory practice,
while potentially improving prospects for capital formation and liquidity,
presents novel questions of market integrity and, more fundamentally,
fairness.
A. Disintermediation of Public Companies
Perhaps one of the most controversial aspects of the technological
innovations achieved over the last decade has been the decreasing
importance of section 5—another way of saying that the public offering
process itself has become less important, or at least more optional.
Technology, in short, has itself enabled a kind of regulatory arbitrage
insofar as engineers and bankers have worked diligently to create market
infrastructures that have made it easier for companies to avoid, or at least
delay, public offerings and to access private capital. For leading
commentators, including professors Bob Thompson and Donald
Langevoort, this has helped usher in the “death” of section 5 altogether.237
The modus operandi for this important development has primarily been
the 144A market. To understand why, it is useful to remember that, like
any capital market, a private placement market requires two things in order
to be viable and competitive: (1) buyers of the securities (institutional
investors), and (2) a functioning secondary market (e.g., a connected
marketplace). Technology has helped foster the conditions for both. On
the one hand, technology has allowed investors to organize themselves as
“institutions” and aggregate their savings and wealth in ways that ever more
easily pass the $100 million under management threshold for qualifying as
236. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act §§ 401–02. Under Tier 1, issuers are
permitted to raise $20 million in a twelve-month period, though subject to state rules and
regulations; meanwhile, under Tier 2, issuers are permitted to raise $50 million, and enjoy
federal preemption, though offerings are subject to more onerous investment limits and
disclosure obligations. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b).
237. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 6; see also Robert B. Thompson & Donald
C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital
Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1604–24 (2013) (examining the general expansion of
alternative IPO-fundraising avenues for startups).
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a QIB.238 Furthermore, brokers no longer need to search their client lists to
decide who is interested in investing and creating funds. With internetbased intermediaries like AngelList, financial firms can instead engage
more potential investors of varying wealth bases online in the promotion of
their investment advisory or brokerage services. Additionally, the backoffice maintenance of these relationships has been made easier with
computer programming and the web.
Just as importantly, technology is enabling experimentation and the
development of a more vibrant 144A secondary market. ECNs and
accredited investor websites are providing a basis for both engaging
qualified investors and connecting them to one another and to early-stage
(and more mature) investments.239 In doing so, the internet is providing an
“inexpensive professional-quality connection to the market,” while also
lowering the cost of capital by reducing the perceived risk of
investments.240 With more information available relating to investments
and their managers on the web, and as prospects for a post-issuance
aftermarket have improved, 144A securities have increased dramatically
over the last two decades, as have IPOs in foreign jurisdictions on largely
electronic exchanges.241
But on the other hand, and even more so than the case of the
disintermediation of exchanges and broker-dealers described in the
subsequent two sections, we see that the rise of the private placement
market, and its encroachment on public offerings, is very much a marriage
of both technological innovation and regulatory reforms. That is, law has
been as important as technology in helping to foster ripe conditions for
circumventing the public offering process.
Rulemaking on the public side of the ledger has helped spur the private
placement market as layers of additional regulatory reporting and corporate
governance requirements have been loaded onto the section 5 framework.
The Sarbanes-Oxley reforms of 2002, for example, notably required public
companies to enhance reporting requirements for financial transactions,
including off-balance-sheet transactions, pro-forma figures, and stock
transactions of corporate officers.242 They require internal controls for
assuring the accuracy of financial reports and disclosures.243 Although
widely lauded for having increased investor confidence, especially for

238. See, e.g., Schwieger, supra note 197, at 896 (summarizing requirements for QIBs).
239. See Douglas Price, Direct Access Execution: ECNs, SOEs, Superdot, and Other
Methods of Trading, 2 J. HIGH TECH L. 1 (2002) (reviewing SIMIT PATEL, DIRECT ACCESS
EXECUTION: ECNS, SOES, SUPERDOT, AND OTHER METHODS OF TRADING (2001)).
240. INGEBRETSEN, supra note 41, at 209.
241. See generally Brummer, supra note 76, at 1438; Coffee, supra note 6 (noting the
potential information-enhancing benefits provided by the internet); Langevoort, Information
Technology, supra note 6 (same). That said, questions persist as to the quality of
information, even as liquidity risks might be assuaged. See generally Pollman, supra note 6
(noting potential risks of lack of information, asymmetric information, conflicts of interest,
and insider trading).
242. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
243. See id. § 302(a)(4)(A).

1022

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

foreign companies cross-listed in the United States, compliance costs
averaged for many companies over $1.5 million in the first years of the
reforms’ implementation.244 Similarly, the Dodd-Frank reforms in the
wake of the financial crisis introduced measures including say-on-pay
requirements for public companies and imposed relationships between
customers and broker-dealers or investment advisers.245
Meanwhile on the private side, efforts focused on reducing the costs of
private placements. As mentioned above, the original section 4(2) of the
Securities Act presented only limited paths available for private placement,
and the parameters of a safe harbor were clouded.246 Forty years later, Rule
144A provided bright-line rules clarifying how issuers could avoid running
afoul of section 4(2) and, by extension, provided a regulatory front from
which technological innovation could create a market infrastructure.247
Figure 2

Since then, both the SEC and legislators have worked assiduously to ease
the need to go public in the first place. Along with the other important
crowd investing provisions of the JOBS Act outlined above, for example, is
Title V, which raises the threshold on the number of shareholders a

244. See Schwieger, supra note 197; Adam Pritchard, Facebook, the JOBS Act, and
Abolishing IPOs, 35 REGULATION 12, 15 (2012) (noting the interest in the JOBS Act at
reducing the burdens generated by Sarbanes-Oxley).
245. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n-1 (2012); Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rules for Say-on-Pay and Golden
Parachute Compensation As Required Under Dodd-Frank Act (Jan. 25, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-25.htm [http://perma.cc/AD82-8ZS4].
246. See Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–mm.
247. See Private Resales of Securities to Institutions, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2014).
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company can have before it is subject to Exchange Act reporting
requirements (e.g., a 10-Q or 10-K).248 Under the earlier rules that were
updated in 1964 with the adoption of section 12(g) of the Exchange Act, a
private company could remain private until it reached five hundred
shareholders.249 Title V changes this limit to two thousand shareholders, or
five hundred shareholders who are unaccredited.250 In combination with
Title II of the JOBS Act, which, as discussed above, removes the
prohibition on general solicitation, this means that many private companies
will both be able to have more shareholders and solicit investments more
broadly than at any point in the last half century.
The practical impetus behind the reforms was to avoid some of the
pressures that growing technology companies like Microsoft and Facebook
encountered that pushed them into arguably premature IPOs. In 1986,
Microsoft had issued incentive stock to employees, “and because of active
trading in secondary markets, this stock became widely dispersed.”251 It
became clear that soon more than five hundred shareholders would own the
stock.252 With the growing shareholder base, Bill Gates decided to conduct
a public offering even when he did not need to raise any capital because the
company would soon be required to comply with Exchange Act disclosure
and compliance rules anyway.253 Facebook later faced similar challenges
in 2011 when Goldman Sachs planned to create a special purpose vehicle
(SPV) in order to allow its clients to invest up to $450 million in the
company.254 The idea was that the SPV would count as one shareholder
and thus allow the company to avoid reporting obligations.255 The SEC
frowned on such an approach, and the company was forced to go public—
again at a time when its capital needs were still somewhat modest as
compared to what it could raise (and did raise) in an IPO.256 The JOBS Act
served in effect to reduce such pressure via new provisions under Title I
that facilitated issuances by “emerging growth companies.”257

248. See Brummer & Gorfine, supra note 230; Susan Beblavi, JOBS Act Title V: Raising
the Threshold for Registration, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE 63 (2013),
http://www.denverlawreview.org/online-articles/2013/4/27/jobs-act-title-v-raising-thethreshold-for-registration.html [http://perma.cc/5B8P-NE8P].
249. See Brummer & Gorfine, supra note 230.
250. See id.
251. Chris Manderson, The “Facebook Problem,” Secondary Market Trading and the
500 Shareholder Rule: Part 2 of a 4-Part Series on the JOBS Act, PE HUB (Apr. 24, 2012),
http://www.pehub.com/2012/04/the-”facebook-problem”-secondary-market-trading-and-the500-shareholder-rule-part-2-of-a-4-part-series-on-the-jobs-act/
[http://perma.cc/23T8-DH
SA].
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. Cf. id.
256. See id.
257. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 101, 126 Stat. 306
(2012). Emerging growth companies, those with less than $1 billion in revenue over the past
fiscal year, are exempt or at least partially exempt from certain burdensome disclosures for a
time. Brummer & Gorfine, supra note 230.

1024

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

Returning then to our original observation, public offerings in the twentyfirst century are even less legally and practically necessary. This is not, of
course, to say that they never happen, or even that they do not encounter
bouts of popularity for companies seeking both to raise large amounts of
capital and promote their brands and brand awareness.258 That said,
technology has worked alongside regulatory reforms to make staying
private easier and private placements more efficient and attractive. These
developments contrast considerably with the public offering process, which
is not only more costly than in the 1930s, but also presents fewer obvious
comparative advantages. As a result, the public offering process, and
indeed public company status, are faced with the uncomfortable prospect of
becoming increasingly marginalized as private markets and private market
infrastructure continue to develop in ways that maximize the flexibility of
recent regulatory reforms.
B. Disintermediation of Exchanges
Accompanying the increasing means of circumventing registration
requirements have been tools to avoid traditional trading environments.
This in turn has created new incentives for exchanges and traders alike, as
well as risks to market integrity.
1. A More Diverse Market Ecosystem
Even more pronounced and rapid than the disintermediation of public
offerings has been the disintermediation of exchanges as sources of
liquidity. From the 1930s through the 1980s, major U.S. exchanges not
only provided listing services for the most important companies in the
country, but, as noted above, they were also the primary sites of secondary
trading. The network externalities inherent to the trading business were
inherently difficult to surmount, leading to a natural congregation of capital
among several leading hubs, with the NYSE at the forefront.
Technology has upended this dominance. Massive real estate is no
longer needed to establish a trading platform. And human beings are rarely
physically present or populate trading venues. Instead, as we have seen,
traders are automatically connected to a trading platform (often brokers
operating through a subscription service) through which they indicate their
willingness to buy or sell units of a security electronically. These orders are
then displayed instantaneously, often via the internet, and the decisions to
execute those trades are made by computers according to preestablished
algorithms that are themselves relatively inexpensive to devise.

258. This has been especially the case recently where macroeconomic engineering has
driven markets higher and, with them, market valuations and the potential returns on public
offerings.
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Figure 3

All the while, attracting liquidity is much easier than in the past,
especially the liquidity necessary for secondary trading. Because investors
can plug in from thousands of miles away, from the comfort of their own
homes and offices, electronic venues can create the energized trading
environment once thought to be the sole province of exchanges and can
operate continuously, 24/7, as long as the trading system is turned on.259
Part of the popularity of ECNs in particular is that they offer a wider
array of services than traditional exchanges. As seen in the history of
alternative trading venues, instead of the twentieth-century unitary model of
exchanges, which relied on liquidity centralization, ECNs position
themselves to fill different market niches and provide a variety of services
to traders and institutional investors.260
But it is worth elaborating that in the process, they operate quite
differently, according to disparate business models, and thus impact price
discovery in varying ways. Some dark pools act as brokers instead of
dealers. In this group, traders develop prices based on the midpoint of the
national best bid and offer (NBBO)—which is the best (lowest) available
ask price and the best (highest) available bid price to investors when they
buy and sell securities261—and the volume-weighted average price

259. See Michael J. Barclay & Terrence Hendershott, Price Discovery and Trading After
Hours, 16 REV. FIN. STUD. 1041, 1044 (2003).
260. See Markham & Harty, supra note 1, at 902–07.
261. The Consolidated Quotation System gives the NBBO for securities listed on the
NYSE, while the Unlisted Trading Privileges Quote Data Feed gives the NBBO for
securities listed on the NASDAQ.
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(VWAP), a popular trading benchmark firms use for their trades.262
Crosses are thus established at the agreed upon benchmark and executed
electronically.
Commentators routinely include “block-crossing” dark pools, called
“ITG Posit,” and Liquidnet in this kind of group.263 Liquidnet’s ATS
system obtains information on a member about its trading intentions via its
order management system (“indications of interest” or “indications”) and
then uses that information to look for execution opportunities, or
“matches,” among members interested in buying and selling the same
stock.264 If a match of indications is detected, the potential buyer and seller
are invited to negotiate with each other, anonymously, through the
Liquidnet system.265 Once the buyer and seller agree on the transaction
Similarly, ITG Posit crosses large
terms, an execution occurs.266
institutional orders randomly several times a day, and Instinet operates
scheduled continuous dark pools with both firms matching buy and sell
orders electronically for execution without first routing the order to an
exchange or other displayed market in order to avoid moving the price of
the security.267
Meanwhile, other dark pools accept market, limit, or paid orders through
continuous non-displayed limit order books that are themselves segmented
from the main exchange. This group has in the past included many of the
dark pools owned by major broker-dealers, including Credit Suisse
Crossfinder, Goldman Sachs Sigma X, Citi Match, Barclays LX, Morgan
Stanley MS Pool, and UBS PRN.268 Unlike the first group, where the
NBBO and VWAP generate the basis of prices, execution prices are derived
from the limit orders submitted by participants. Price discovery can
arguably thus take place, though even here the trade sizes are often much
smaller when compared to their block-size counterparts, and traders can use
cloaking algorithms, as they do on public exchanges, to split “parent”
orders into smaller “children” orders across networks to further mask
trading activities and intentions.269 Dark pools in this group also can
contain proprietary order flows from the broker-dealers that operate them

262. VWAP is calculated by adding up the dollars traded for every transaction (price
multiplied by number of shares traded) and then dividing by the total shares traded for the
day. See Definition of “Volume Weighted Average Price—VWAP”, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/vwap.asp (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/
T543-66B3].
263. See, e.g., Haoxiang Zhu, Online Appendix of “Do Dark Pools Harm Price
Discovery?” 3 (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.mit.edu/~zhuh/Zhu_darkpool_online
appendix.pdf [http://perma.cc/2ZKU-GWHR].
264. See Liquidnet, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 9596, Exchange Act Release No.
72339 (June 6, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2014/33-9596.pdf [http://perma.
cc/97AD-NBV7].
265. See id. at 3.
266. See id.
267. See Zhu, supra note 263, at 1.
268. See id.
269. See, e.g., Rise of the Machines, ECONOMIST (Jul. 30, 2009), http://www.economist.
com/node/14133802 [http://perma.cc/Q7DH-B285].
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and thus create quasi-dealer relationships. Furthermore, transaction prices
on these platforms are not necessarily calculated from the best bid and offer
using a transparent rule.
Finally, a third group comprises entities at times classified as dark pools,
in which incoming orders are rejected or accepted on fast-moving electronic
markets.270 These kinds of traders have historically included firms like
Getco and Knight. There is no internal matching as they compete for
business like other market participants. In contrast with dark pools in the
other groups discussed above, these HFTs invariably trade on their own
accounts as principles as opposed to agents or marketplaces, and the fastest
are periodically considered to be “pools” given the volume of their
trades.271
Each kind of actor potentially provides varying advantages vis-à-vis one
another and exchanges. Block-size dark pools have the advantage of
operating in many ways free of opportunistic algorithmic trading but do not
necessarily offer a continuous trading environment or the kind of
transparency that reflects the overall market demand for a security. As with
the “upstairs” trading at the NYSE, they are not transparent and, given the
larger size of the institutional orders, may find execution (best or otherwise)
more difficult because counterparties with equally large positions (and a
willingness to trade) must be identified. Other kinds of dark pools
meanwhile offer a kind of continuous trading environment that mimics the
flow of liquidity on exchanges and potentially help generate post-trade data
from exchanges. That said, as segmented venues, they also impair liquidity
formation and, with the prevalence of hidden orders, undermine
informational efficiency as market participants have only incomplete
information as to the overall depth of the market for securities. Slower
traders may also find themselves more vulnerable to faster-paced,
computer-driven algorithmic players.

270. See Zhu, supra note 263, at 1.
271. See id. at 2.
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Dark Pool Trading Mechanisms272

Type

Example

Block Crossing
System

Liquidnet, BIDS,
Instinet Cross

Continuous Cross

Credit Suisee
Crossfinder, Goldman
Sachs Sigma X,
Barclays LX, Morgan
Stanly MS Pool, Getco
and Knight

Liquidity Cross

Getco and Knight

Key Features
Large blocks from
institutional investors
traded with and
between one another
Dark pool operates
continuous,
nondisplayed limit
order books accepting
market, limit, or
“pegged orders” that
establish prices based
in part on observable
market data or an
agreed upon
benchmark
Dark pool operators
generally trade on
their own accounts as
principles (as opposed
to agents or
marketplaces) to
accept or reject
immediately incoming
orders

And ECNs are not the only players evolving intermediary platforms to
challenge exchanges. Broker-dealers themselves have developed backoffice platforms for “internalizing” the orders of their clients, and, just as
important, a range of websites under the flexibility of Rule 144A and the
JOBS Act are poised to increasingly “list” private securities in ways that
disintermediate exchanges altogether, a topic this Article explores in more
depth in the following section.
2. New Incentive Structures for Trading Venues
With the rise in competition, exchanges consequently hunt liquidity
much like any other market participant. Exchanges cannot, in other words,
assume that companies seeking to raise capital will necessarily do so on
their exchange or via exchanges even more generally. Moreover, secondary

272. See id. at 3.
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trading is no longer confined to one- or two-floor exchanges, but is instead
more widely dispersed, both geographically and from the standpoint of
venue, than at any time in the last half century. Specialists no longer
monopolize the trading in any one security. Instead, multiple market
makers routinely offer competing offers and bids for securities. Indeed, the
most recent reports indicate that off-exchange venues like dark pools and
ECNs host 40 percent of U.S. stock trading activity.273
From this standpoint, technological innovation has addressed one of the
core problems of exchanges from the 1930s: the anticompetitiveness and
rent seeking enabled by monopoly power. With more electronic and
computer-based competition, the NYSE and traditional exchanges are illpositioned to charge high commissions or trading fees for their services.
On the other hand, the disintermediation of exchanges and exchange
services has unleashed efforts by exchanges (and their ECN competitors) to
attract transactions from today’s major liquidity providers, the HFTs.
Among the most notable involve the development of different kinds of
order types for high-frequency traders that participate and make orders on
the exchange. Furthermore, “maker-taker” fees—pioneered by Island in the
late 1990s but adopted by exchanges including the NYSE—that reward
HFTs for providing liquidity on the exchange, while charging customers
(often mutual funds and pension funds seeking to buy blocks of stocks),
take that liquidity.274 By offering kickbacks of this sort, maker-taker fees
encourage trading by incentivizing firms to post orders on an exchange,
boosting trading activity.275
This business model, however, runs counter to the traditional “customer
priority” design, where customer accounts are given order priority without
having to pay exchange transaction fees.276 And they create vastly different
incentives to trade. Because of the rebates, brokers have been said to
channel orders to markets that provide the best maker-taker payments, not
the best price for customers, thereby harming investors.277 What is more,
273. See John McCrank, U.S. Securities Watchdog to Monitor Off-Exchange Stock
Trading, REUTERS (Jan. 31, 2014, 5:34 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/31/
regulations-finra-darkpools-idUSL2N0L521K20140131 (noting that 40 percent of this
activity occurs away from the thirteen public securities exchanges, on around forty-five
alternative trading venues) [http://perma.cc/9ABY-ZPA2]; James McAndrews & Chris
Stefanadis, The Emergence of Electronic Communications Networks in the U.S. Equity
Markets, 6 CURRENT ISSUES ECON. & FIN. 1, 3 (2000), http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/
current_issues/ci6-12.pdf [http://perma.cc/CY8A-PHXK].
274. See PATTERSON, supra note 103, at 158–59.
275. Without the fees, some financial institutions have argued, fewer traders would post
limit orders as they are most likely to be filled (at a loss) when new information arises
indicating they are mispriced to the detriment of traders and more likely to go unexecuted
where new information mitigates in their favor. See Dolgopolov, supra note 179, at 238–39
(noting that maker-taker rules “reward[] the very provision of liquidity by compensating for
the pick-off risk of exposing limit orders”).
276. See Sherree DeCovny, Balancing the Options: Customer Priority Versus MakerTaker in the U.S. Equity Options Markets, FUTURES INDUSTRY, Mar./Apr. 2008, at 28–30.
277. See Editorial, The Hidden Costs of Trading Stocks: “Best Execution’” and Rebates
for Brokers, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/23/opinion/bestexecution-and-rebates-for-brokers.html?_r=1 [http://perma.cc/H5PP-UXPL].
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the integrity and efficiency of markets are potentially undermined. Critics
argue that publicly viewed bid/offer prices in the market are distorted to the
extent to which rebates are not openly reflected in the market for
participants, especially for retail investors, to see.278 Furthermore, the
rebates allow HFTs to buy and sell shares at the same price and to merely
exploit the rebates, again obscuring the “real value” or “true price” of a
security.279 Trading, in short, is rebate generated and not necessarily driven
by new information or economic fundamentals.
Another significant development, again pioneered by ECNs in the 1990s
but later adopted by exchanges, has been the development of colocation
services for privileged (or paying) exchange customers. For a fee,
exchanges offer broker-dealers the opportunity “to place their trading
computers in the same data centers that house an exchange’s computer
servers.”280 This gives the colocated traders tremendous advantages over
other investors. Most traders see only the consolidated tape of prices that
are fed through and connect exchanges in New York, Chicago, and other
cities. But by being placed directly next to exchange servers, colocated
traders get information with essentially advance notice, and with
information (often for milliseconds) that others do not have, on which they
trade. Given the massive advantages such asymmetric informational
superiority conveys, “trading firms, from Wall Street banks to highfrequency hedge funds and market makers, spend millions each year” in
order to “access prices a split second faster through direct feeds.”281
At the extremes, exchanges have, according to recent lawsuits, taken the
concept of speed yet a further step forward by selling private feeds of
market data to customers before releasing the information to the public via
the consolidated tape.282 According to plaintiffs, paying customers can
receive the data in as little as one microsecond, whereas it takes 1500
microseconds for the data to reach the processor (and then additional time
for the data to be transmitted by the processor to ordinary customers).283 If
true, the strategy would violate Regulation NMS’s dictates that exchanges
furnish the data “as promptly as possible” and not discriminate against other
market participants in the distribution of that information.284
Both individually and collectively, maker-taker fees, colocation services,
and private data feeds reflect the disintermediation of exchanges as liquidity

278. Dave Michaels, Trading Rebates Skew Markets, NYSE and Allies Tell SEC,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 21, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-0221/trading-rebates-skew-markets-nyse-and-allies-tell-sec [http://perma.cc/4L5B-TJWP].
279. See Editorial, supra note 277.
280. See Geoffrey Rogow, Colocation: The Root of All High-Frequency Trading Evil?,
WALL STREET J. BLOGS (Sep. 20, 2012, 1:57 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/
2012/09/20/collocation-the-root-of-all-high-frequency-trading-evil/ [http://perma.cc/Q8Z5SPQW].
281. See id.
282. See, e.g., Lanier v. BATS Exchange, No. 14-cv-3745, 2015 WL 191446 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 28, 2015).
283. See id. at 12.
284. Order Protection Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 242.611(a) (2014).
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monopolists (or oligopolists) and, by extension, regulatory gatekeepers.
The NYSE in particular no longer controls transactions in its shares, and
trading is dispersed along a fragmented terrain of regional exchanges,
ECNs, and other OTC markets. As this development has progressed, the
NYSE has shifted from operating as a provider of liquidity, as was in effect
their role in the 1930s environment where large firms had limited options
with regard to where they listed and traded securities, to a host. As such,
their business models have changed from warding off competition to
engaging it head on and even mimicking many of their revenue-generating
techniques. In some instances, this may be a cause for celebration, such as
the NYSE’s shift to a more automated system of transaction execution that
has lowered commission fees for retail investors and institutions alike. But
it also can create incentives to behave in ways that not only stretch, but
arguably violate, established norms for exchanges both as venues and as
financial intermediaries for customers.
C. The Fall . . . and Rise of Broker-Dealers
The disruption of exchanges had large and immediate implications for
the broker-dealers operating on them. Although necessary at the turn of the
century, and in the early stages of the automatization process, human beings
are no longer required as before to take customer orders and execute them.
Indeed, they compare poorly to the extent to which they have shown
themselves to be slower, and far less accurate, than their electronic
counterparts in both front- and back-office operations. This has led to a
wholesale restructuring of the industry, and exchange brokers and dealers
who survived the technological upgrades saw their profits fall as declining
spreads and commissions cut into their pay.285
But this is only one-half of the story. For all of the dislocation caused by
computerized trading, technology also created new opportunities for brokerdealers. After all, at the heart of a broker-dealer’s work is “matching”
investments to investors, albeit by commission, and/or making smart
investments on its own account. Electronic trading presented new
opportunities to do so on a scale not contemplated by earlier generations.
So not surprisingly, brokers used technology to create new kinds of
matching services. On traditional exchanges, specialists abandoned their
traditional informational advantages and assumed new nominations as
“designated market makers” (DMMs). As DMMs, they could no longer
receive an advance look at incoming orders, and instead provided liquidity
according to preestablished protocols that catered to electronic orders.
Meanwhile, other broker-dealers operating outside of the formal exchange
system began to assume exchange-like functions insofar as they themselves
began to host and became venues for securities trading. Importantly, these
venues were not necessarily monopolized by one market maker. Instead,

285. See generally McAndrews & Stefanadis, supra note 273 (discussing the effects from
the proliferation of ECNs).
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they were built out in ways that allowed other broker-dealers (as well as
funds, investment managers, and institutional investors) to aggregate—and
that platform itself could be connected to others.
By making these changes in the face of changing technological
developments, many broker-dealers have survived and thrived, and a new
generation of financial services intermediaries has come of age. With the
help of ever more powerful technological tools, broker-dealers can funnel
trading into networks that bypass traditional exchange infrastructure. At the
same time, many have not only become agents of liquidity, but are also
dominant sources of liquidity via their HFT arms and algorithmic trading
outfits. The sheer volume of orders made possible by instantaneous trades
and millisecond-based execution has by extension transformed the very
nature of liquidity on exchange markets. Liquidity is no longer a simple
function of supply and demand dynamics, but is instead often driven by the
arbitrage opportunities enabled by speed and superior data management.
Broker-dealers have likewise capitalized on the internet in particular to
change their business model from the ground up. In all but name, brokerdealers can increasingly “list” securities on their own for investment.
Crowdfunding websites allow financial services intermediaries to match
investors with investment opportunities, one of the core functions of
brokers, but on a scale far greater than before and in ways that can
aggregate investors collectively. Likewise, and as mentioned above, the
operators of 144A crowdfunding platforms are increasingly poised to
provide a means for investing in private companies and other entities in the
comfort of a controlled professional space, accredited investors’ homes.
There are, of course, plenty of mainline broker-dealers who continue to
offer and provide marketing functions for offerings.286 That said, none of
the most consequential changes in trading infrastructure or operations map
onto the 1930s regulatory framework, which envisioned a far different
market ecosystem than is the case today. The framers of the 1930s
legislation envisioned exchanges as the dominant meeting place for
securities trading and, thus, the broker-dealers operating on them as agents
(albeit oligopolistic ones) of market integrity. These regulatory gatekeepers
thus became subject to federal securities legislation and obligations of
maintaining orderly markets.
But freed from exchange infrastructure, and the regulatory requirements
associated with it, broker-dealers operating ECNs have, for the most part,
been under no obligation to satisfy traditional market-making
responsibilities.287 Instead, best execution obligations to connect limit

286. Though even here, technology has greatly impacted their operations. See Coffee,
supra note 6, at 1208; Langevoort, Information Technology, supra note 6, at 777.
287. Indeed, according to some commentators, “[u]nlike the traditional market-maker and
specialist systems, [the new intermediaries] have no obligation to provide liquidity, just the
incentive provided by the rebate they receive every time a market participant takes liquidity
from them.” Anthony Saliba et al., Ephemeral Liquidity in a Purely Order-Driven Market,
TABBFORUM (May 23, 2010), http://tabbforum.com/opinions/ephemeral-liquidity-in-apurely-order-driven-market [http://perma.cc/8FC3-JUCP].
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orders to venues that meet Regulation NMS dictates are the mechanism
through which the maintenance of orderly markets rely.288 In practice, this
means that broker-dealers are obligated to swap downside market-making
obligations normally associated with traditional exchanges for upside best
execution restraints in today’s markets. The two are, by their nature, in no
way overlapping; the net result is risk siphoned off from market makers in
turbulent market environments. Algorithmically generated limit orders
from HFTs can, in short, disappear in milliseconds—as quickly as they
appear—for no reason other than downward market momentum. This, in
turn, can enable “flash crashes,” like that of May 6, 2010, which can
undermine the stability of technically interconnected capital markets.289
Plus, rogue or unexpected algorithm activity or faulty hardware or software
can cause systems to short-circuit or freeze, creating new operational
risks.290
More fundamentally, broker-dealer regulation is itself facing potential
changes as the internet and technology dramatically transform the very
business models of financial services firms and broker-dealers in particular.
With new technologies available to broker-dealers to aggregate liquidity,
the need to charge transaction-based commissions tied to marketing efforts
has diminished. Instead, financial intermediaries can generate alternative
sources of revenue, like trading fees or other proprietary or bespoke
services, for participants on the platform.
The most significant example of such innovation arose in venture capital
services, which have sought to leverage web-based social media and crowd
investing. In 2013, FundersClub, a private placement platform, initiated a
new business model whereby it would avoid broker-dealer requirements by
in part mimicking the matching qualities seen on electronic trading
platforms.291 In short, FundersClub created a website that offered
opportunities to invest in specifically identified private companies listed on
the site. Members of the FundersClub platform then can invest, but only
288. See Markham & Harty, supra note 1, at 911–13. There have been some first order
regulatory initiatives for ECNs, though none have radically changed the responsibilities of
infrastructure providers. See, e.g., Regulation of Non-Public Trading Interest, 74 Fed. Reg.
61,208 (Nov. 23, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242). FINRA has additionally
released limited rules relating to ATS reporting of equity volume, other reporting issues, and
clock synchronization. See FINRA, Reg. Notice No. 14-51 (Nov. 2014); FINRA, Reg.
Notice No. 14-48 (Nov. 2014); FINRA, Reg. Notice No. 14-17 (Apr. 2014).
289. See generally Ian Poirier, High-Frequency Trading and the Flash Crash: Structural
Weaknesses in the Securities Markets and Proposed Regulatory Responses, 8 HASTINGS BUS.
L.J. 445 (2012) (discussing causes and effects of flash crashes along with prescriptive advice
on how to mitigate the costs of such a phenomenon). Between 2:45:13 p.m. and 2:45:27
p.m., stocks of some major companies like Procter & Gamble lost nearly all their value, and
others like Apple surged to values of nearly $100,000. See WORLD FINANCE, Nov.–Dec.
2014, at 153.
290. In 2013, for example, in the space of just forty-five minutes, the financial services
company Knight Capital lost over $440 million as a result of unexpected and, according to
some, “freak” algorithm activity. WORLD FINANCE, supra note 289, at 153.
291. See How FundersClub Works, FUNDERSCLUB, https://fundersclub.com/how-itworks/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) (providing general information on FundersClub’s
operational and business framework) [http://perma.cc/4WF4-HGLD].
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after first certifying themselves as accredited investors and waiting thirty
days.292 FundersClub then aggregates members into a venture capital fund
that makes an investment, which is then managed by FundersClub on a
post-investment basis.293 It was compensated, notably, for its efforts via a
carried interest in the fund.294 Months later, a similar approach was
adopted by AngelList, with the additional innovation of leveraging the
insights, experience, and efforts of third-party “Lead Angels,” whereby a
fund organized by AngelList would invest only alongside a recognized
investor who may or may not also receive a portion of the carried
interest.295
In some ways, the deal dynamics were merely web-based venture capital.
But at the same time, they created novel challenges of interpretation.
Though clearly the venture capital fund would have to comply with rules
relating to investment advisors, would the platforms themselves (and their
operators) require broker-dealer regulation? After all, the matching services
performed, in some ways, the same services as twentieth-century brokerdealers by connecting investment dollars to investments with the help of a
middleman. The difference here, however, is how a broker-dealer’s
earnings are derived. Instead of a commission, which itself incentivized at
times unscrupulous salesmanship, here the middleman would earn by
participating in the investment’s carried interest. It is also, notably, a
venture among accredited investors who can presumably “fend for
themselves.”296 With this in mind, the SEC, in a no-action letter, ultimately
declined to enforce against the operators of the FundersClub and AngelList
websites for failing to register as a broker-dealer under the Exchange
Act.297
292. See Sile Bao, How Much of My Time Does FundersClub Take? How Long Does the
Process Take?, FUNDERSCLUB (Mar. 23, 2015, 1:10 AM), https://support.fundersclub.
com/hc/en-us/articles/204477348-How-much-of-my-time-does-FundersClub-take-Howlong-does-the-process-take- [http://perma.cc/9HR3-ZEF4].
293. See How FundersClub Works, supra note 291.
294. See Using the Web to Match Private Companies and Potential Investors: SEC No
Action Letters Open a Door, but Questions Remain, GOODWIN PROCTER: CLIENT ALERT
(Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.goodwinprocter.com/Publications/Newsletters/Client-Alert/2013/
0402_Using-the-Web-to-Match-Private-Companies-and-Potential-Investors.aspx [hereinafter
GOODWIN PROCTOR: CLIENT ALERT] [http://perma.cc/5UC7-MLG5].
295. Investors, once becoming interested via the platform, would submit a request for
information about the company, and if there was a sufficient amount of interest, AngelList
Advisors would create a subscription agreement for each participating investor. See
AngelList, SEC No-Action Letter, ¶ 3 (Mar. 28, 2013).
296. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (noting that the section 4(a)(2)
exemption for registration should turn on, among other things, whether offerees of securities
“are shown to be able to fend for themselves”).
297. See GOODWIN PROCTOR: CLIENT ALERT, supra note 294. In essence, as AngelList
noted, its model would be similar to that used by Angel Capital Electronic Network, an
earlier web-based platform for accredited investors granted relief a decade earlier. See
AngelList, supra note 295, ¶ 36. The website, designed to list small, private companies, was
granted no-action relief, in large part on the basis of the fact that Angel Capital would not
provide advice about the merits of a particular venture, receive any compensation contingent
upon the outcome of any transaction, or hold themselves out as providing securities-related
services other than a listing or matching service. Id.
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Notably, the JOBS Act has cleared a path for a similar bypassing of
broker-dealer rules for financial services firms connecting early-stage
investment opportunities to non-accredited investors, assuming certain
conditions are filled. In the legislation, crowdfunding portals—the websites
displaying ventures in need of funding—are recognized as a new kind of
financial intermediary legally distinct from broker-dealers and are not
required to undergo the same registration requirements. Although the
portals will be subject to supervision by FINRA, the self-regulatory agency
that (not coincidentally) oversees broker-dealers, there are no “know the
customer obligations,” as would be expected by typical broker-dealers.
Instead, investments are merely posted on the website, according to some
business prerogative or objective or after inspection by the portal manager,
and the onus of “knowing” the customer resides in ensuring that certain
prudential requirements (e.g., the investment caps) are properly
administered.
IV. RETHINKING TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY REGULATORY RESPONSES
At this point, it is helpful to reiterate that not all of the disruption outlined
above is necessarily bad. With markets meeting the web, investors are in
many ways better armed and better equipped to access information relevant
to their decisions than ever before.
That said, the accelerating
disintermediation of New Deal gatekeepers places unprecedented stress on
traditional regulatory approaches and forms of market supervision.
Outdated regulatory approaches have, for their part, the potential of stifling
even useful forms of innovation. And in those areas where disruption
complicates or undermines investor protection or market integrity, one-shot
substantive reforms of existing regulatory approaches are highly unlikely to
be durable. As this part shows, not only are foundational categories and
focal points of 1930s regulatory oversight increasingly out of kilter with the
new market ecosystem, but multiplying policy objectives and increased
uncertainty as to the market impact of reforms also hamper the rulemaking
process. Indeed, even where agencies unveil smart new approaches, the
specter of technological innovation can render even upgraded regulatory
approaches outdated in a matter of milliseconds.
As a result, the challenge of disruptive technology and securities
regulation requires not only rethinking the substance of regulation but also
rethinking the process by which administration is administered. This part
provides both the rationale and basic typology for a move from reactive,
prescriptive regulation—also a relic of New Deal reforms in the wake of the
Great Depression—to more responsive, adaptive forms of supervisory
oversight.
A. The Challenge of Expanding the Regulatory Perimeter
As seen in Part I, securities regulation has long enjoyed, as a key
component of its operative strategy, the dragooning of several key
intermediaries into the service of national policy objectives.
By
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(mandatorily) registering and supervising central nodes of the financial
services industry and the originators and facilitators of securities issuances,
regulators could cast a wide net with which to promote investor protection
and market integrity. Thus, not surprisingly, as the market ecosystem has
changed, interest in expanding the regulatory perimeter has blossomed—
either by imposing more duties on existing actors or extending new
regulations to emerging players in the ecosystem. Such approaches,
however, have proven difficult to execute due to several practical and
administrative challenges.
1. Old Categories Do Not (Always) Fit
the New Market Ecosystem
Rapid technological change makes expanding the regulatory perimeter
more difficult, at least insofar as it has been accomplished in the past. At a
basic level, technological and deal-driven innovation has progressed to such
a point that intermediaries no longer fit neatly into twentieth-century molds
of exchanges, specialists, floor brokers, and even broker-dealers. Statutory
definitions are out of date, and broker-dealers, exchanges, and investment
advisers provide overlapping, and in some instances economically, identical
services. Regulatory action, as a result, has become more difficult “as
markets provide ever more viable [or attractive] choices” for firms and
individuals seeking to raise capital or trade securities.298
Plus, there is not only a multiplicity of regulators, but also a myriad of
outdated conceptual and jurisdictional tools relied on by them. For
example, efforts by FINRA, the SEC, and state regulators to target firms
based on presumptions of commission-driven jurisdictional hooks for
broker-dealers will be less relevant in a world where the revenues generated
by intermediaries and infrastructure operators are derived from listing and
trading fees or from providing venture capital advice and consulting
services. Similarly, efforts to define or capture new intermediaries can be
difficult.299 Take the simple exercise of defining (and regulating)
“exchanges”: defining exchanges as venues that provide formal listing
services, or even trading environments for major companies, is increasingly
under strain where secondary trading is hosted by ECNs and where listing
(especially in private placements) is increasingly becoming a less formal
means of advertising an investment opportunity. Even basic concepts of
“private” and “public” offerings become more difficult to disentangle to the
extent to which more money is raised in private offerings than in traditional
IPOs.

298. Steven M. Davidoff, Paradigm Shift: Federal Securities Regulation in the New
Millennium, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 339, 340 (2008).
299. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of “PrinciplesBased Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV.
1411, 1481–84 (2007) (discussing principles-based rhetoric in relation to jurisdictional
competition).
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2. Regulatory Objectives Have Multiplied
in the Post-Crisis (and Post-Recession) Era
Moving further afield, even where targeting specific financial
intermediaries is, from a conceptual standpoint, relatively straightforward,
just how to do so may not be. This is in part because deeper or broader
regulation could conflict with other important policy priorities. As we saw
above, the regulation of exchanges has consistently been mired in questions
of the primacy of liquidity or competitiveness.
And even more
fundamentally, U.S. securities laws, like the SEC that enforces them, are
imbued with varying policy goals, from investor protection to market
integrity, with both occasionally conflicting with one another.300
That said, the potential for regulatory dissonance is higher now than in
the past. And it is not just because financial innovation has restructured
markets and the optics through which we view gatekeepers. It also is
because recent post-crisis legislation has emphasized, albeit in varying
sections of the regulation, both more regulation in light of financial
innovation and fewer regulatory costs for raising capital, especially for
small and medium-sized businesses seeking capital in a world of reduced
bank lending. Superimposing both objectives and their own statutory
ecosystems onto the New Deal framework creates a number of challenging
trade-offs where ambitious expansions of regulatory remit are taken.
The JOBS Act provides a simple, straightforward example. By design,
the JOBS Act was devised in order to reduce the regulatory burdens
associated with making public offerings, especially for early-stage
companies looking to access cash for ventures. But by doing so, it
dislocates and sidelines other players: investment bankers are no longer
working to underwrite the transactions; no listing is made on a fully
regulated exchange; and the disclosures of a traditional public offering are
greatly reduced. This then raises questions of investor protection, and with
other gatekeepers out of the picture, the most logical place of regulatory
pressure is the portal listing the securities. However, by doing so, costs that
are placed on portals are driven up and offerings are potentially forced to
register, which reduces their ability to earn revenues and ultimately forces
them into the more rarified space of private placements. As a result, the
idea of providing retail investors with modest opportunities to participate in
early-stage ventures (and the ability of early-stage companies to access their
capital) is largely frustrated.
The balance becomes all the more complicated with other (laudatory)
goals like financial stability, which take center stage in rulemaking and
supervision. In a post-Lehman Brothers world, the SEC has been tasked
alongside other agencies with new responsibilities to ensure sound and
300. Specifically, the SEC is charged with powers to (a) protect investors; (b) maintain
fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and (c) facilitate capital formation. See The Investor’s
Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates
Capital Formation, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Nov. 27,
2015) [http://perma.cc/68N8-7532].
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stable markets—which increasingly involve issues of market design and
electronic operations. Meeting the challenge will not be easy. As in the
1960s back-office crisis, today’s technology can lead to more efficient
services, but if poorly implemented, it also can replicate and generate new
problems that are as damaging to investor confidence as human error and
sluggishness. Moreover, in a world of computer-driven trading, where the
frequency of transactions is driving transaction volumes to ever-dizzying
heights, glitches in technology, as well as faulty programming, have outsize
effects on financial markets. The introduction of technology can thus help
crack oligopolies and discipline old-line market actors, yet at the same time
generate new sources of systemic risk. Consequently, any regulatory
response can at least potentially have a range of trade-offs with regard to
other policy goals, including capital formation and market liquidity.
3. Extreme Policy Uncertainty Is Ill-Suited
to Longstanding Administrative Processes
How to regulate may also be difficult, even where policy goals are clear,
because of the novelty that many regulatory issues present. Technology is
not only accelerating trends that have been in motion for a half-century, like
the speed of making or executing market transactions, it is also reshaping
how market actors respond by disintermediating gatekeepers and even
supplanting human judgment with computer programming.301
The novelty of such changes places enormous strain on governmental
response mechanisms. The consequences of microstructural change of this
order, especially given its constant flux, is difficult, and in many instances
impossible, to predict—as are the repercussions of any particular portfolio
of regulatory reform. As scholars have noted in similar contexts, law is
both an endogenous and exogenous force in shaping market ecosystems.302
Regulations inform the commitments and relationships created by market
participants, undergird the certainty behind financial transactions, and can
serve as the focal point for technological innovation. Law can thus alter the
competitive and cooperative relationships and interactions among market
participants and infrastructure providers in ways that in turn give rules
unexpected consequences.
Again, Regulation NMS serves as a useful example. As seen above, the
best price mandates embraced in the reforms not only imposed higher
regulatory burdens, but also ignited the ECN industry and even algorithmic
trading.
Once the reforms were promulgated, AI was not only
commercially practical, but a practical necessity. Now, all trading venues
have to constantly monitor the price of the stock on every trading venue, all
the time, a feat that requires industrial-strength computer power. Though

301. See Cristie Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the Global
Financial Crisis, 55 MCGILL L.J. 257, 279–80 (2010).
302. See, e.g., D. Sornette, Endogenous Versus Exogenous Origins of Crises, ETH
ZURICH, http://www.er.ethz.ch/media/essays/origins.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2015)
[http://perma.cc/CNS3-NJQD].
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the SEC was aware of the potential that such reforms would require using
technology to upgrade existing systems for compliance purposes, few
imagined a world where such operating systems would displace auction
systems and the traditional trading floors altogether—and in the process
potentially fragment the market’s price discovery processes.303
Policy uncertainty of this sort presents problems for today’s regulatory
system. U.S. agencies act via processes that are themselves mediated
through comprehensive planning and prescriptive regulation. For the SEC
to promulgate rules, proposals must usually be shared with the public
through notice-and-comment processes and run through varying levels of
internal evaluation and, not infrequently, government-wide coordination.304
Furthermore, judicial dictates require “hyper detailed predecisional impact
assessments” in order to establish a robust capacity to predict and assess the
market and nonmarket impacts of any proposed action.305
Reacting at the administrative level to the responses of regulated entities
to regulatory reforms can in turn become difficult, especially when firstorder rules require either legislative compromise or significant
administrative resources. Policymakers are incentivized to cram “all that
c[an] possibly be thought or dreamed about actions they carry out, fund, or
authorize into single-shot, all-encompassing decision extravaganzas.”306
Once made, decisions take their course, in ways expected and otherwise,
and authorities (and market participants and the public at large) live with
the consequences until a future crisis arises or economic or political cycles
change. Regulatory action, as a result, can often become ossified as new
priorities crowd an administrative or rulemaking agenda. Little effort is
made to refine or modify decisions made, making first-order regulatory
decisions all the more weighty—and often slow to be made. Law thus
tends to be more static, and outdated, than would be warranted in any
context of dynamic change.
B. The Attractiveness (and Limitations)
of Objectives-Based Regulation
One potentially attractive answer to such challenges has been the
implementation of more targeted “objectives-based” regulation.307

303. See Michael Stockham & Mackenzie Wallace, SEC Enforcement Priorities for the
Second Half of 2014, RISK.NET (July 11, 2014), http://www.risk.net/operational-risk-andregulation/opinion/2354496/sec-enforcement-priorities-for-the-second-half-of-2014
[http://perma.cc/9A5Y-TZ4J].
304. See Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2014).
305. Id.
306. See id. at 5; Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Empiricism, Experimentalism, and
Conditional Theory, 67 SMU L. REV. 141, 167 (2014) (describing the view among new
experimentalists who decry the pluralist interest group model as broken, captured by the
regulated, and ossified).
307. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL
REGULATORY STRUCTURE 142–46 (2008) (discussing the advantages of objectives-based
regulation).
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Although the precise contours of the term are occasionally subject to some
debate, ultimately the idea turns on evaluating compliance with agency
rules in terms of the degree to which a regulator’s objectives and policy
preferences are met. Objectives-based regulation is often associated with
“principles-based regulation.”308 This need not, however, be the case. In
contrast to principles based regulation, objectives-based regulation not only
queries whether participants are acting within the spirit of underlying rules,
but also whether conduct achieves a specific objective.
At the same time, objectives-based regulation acknowledges that there
may be more than one way to achieve a specific regulatory objective. And
thus, some forms of compliance may be more efficient or effective for some
market participants than others.
Because of this flexibility, some
commentators associate it with “minimalist” liberal theories of governance
that give license to market-based decision making.309 For regulators,
however, the appeal of objectives-based regulation is that the specifics of
hard-to-operationalize mandates can be informed “more dynamically and
insightfully by those with the greatest understanding of the relevant
situations.”310
In short, regulatory rules are not so much supposed to be “vague” as
much as relevant—and rather than ossifying, compliance practices are
expected to evolve as older formulations are updated with new
technologies, market practices, and risks (and opportunities) for the
investing public. For this reason, for example, many regulators laud
approaches like FINRA’s “know your customer” and “suitability” rules that
give supervisors broad powers when applying standards of fairness,
appropriate disclosure, and fiduciary duty obligations where broker-dealers
interact with the public. With rapidly changing intermediaries and firms
processing investments, a flexible, though potentially upward-ratcheting,
system of engagement helped authorities respond to markets in ways that
helped cabin opportunities to exploit gaps in an increasingly outmoded,
eighty-year-old system of rule-based prescriptions. Similarly, the SEC’s
new Regulation SCI requires entities like exchanges and other infrastructure
providers to “design[], develop[], test[], maintain[], operate[], and surveil[]

308. See generally Vincent Di Lorenzo, Principles-Based Regulation and Legislative
Congruence, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 45 (2012) (providing a general overview on
principles-based regulation).
309. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the
Administrative State, 100 GEO L.J. 53, 64–69, 78–82 (2011) (comparing minimalist systems
employing market-based regulatory mechanisms and experimentalist approaches boasting
decentralization, monitoring, continuous revision, and stakeholder participation as two
different alternatives to command and control).
310. Dan Awrey, Regulating Financial Innovation: A More Principles-Based Proposal?,
5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 273, 292–93 (2011). For this same reason, it should be
distinguished from approaches such as that of Macey & O’Hara, see Macey & O’Hara, supra
note 6, at 20, which argues for effectively voluntary regulatory regimes of regulatory
compliance as opposed to mandatory ones.
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systems” that are integral to their operations and requires that their
technology meets prescribed operational standards.311
The ability to institutionalize objectives-based regulation will
nevertheless depend on the circumstances. First, some objectives clearly
will be more important than others, or have priority whereas others will not.
Where objectives have a clear hierarchy, creating a system that reflects
primary policy concerns is rather straightforward; where on the other hand
objectives occupy the same levels of importance, the trade-offs inherent to
pursuing any one compliance approach can produce uncertainty by
regulated entities as to optimal compliance strategies.
Furthermore, the ability to graft objectives to the changing market
ecosystem will vary. For example, the violation of antifraud rules can be
relatively easy to spot even in today’s quickly evolving marketplace.312
Making omissions or misstatements tied to the sale of securities is
identifiable whether they are conducted online or in person. Similarly, even
if venues change, false or deceptive statements about who is operating the
system or performing the trades are easily cognizable as fraudulent, and
even traditional antifraud concepts and remedies are sufficient to address
old problems in new contexts.
Enforcement becomes harder when old concepts themselves go under
partial revision due to changes in market infrastructure. Take the issue of
front running, for example. As we saw above, in the 1930s, there was a
concern related to the ability of specialists to extract rents (through higher
bid-ask spreads) given their ability to see orders coming down the pike.313
Today, it is commonly associated with high-speed market makers, who
weave in between markets. But are the two the same? In OTC markets,
HFT traders may or may not be market makers and, in any case, do not
have access to a formal limit book like specialists a half-century ago.
Instead, the market ecosystem has changed. They may pay for direct feeds
from exchanges or other venues, which give them time advantages. But
advantages in time, in and of themselves, could also be analogous to floor
traders and brokers who first had access to the telegraph in the 1800s,
phone banks in the mid-twentieth century, and later the fax machine. With
faster communications, brokers and dealers with access to technology could
leverage their information before others—and securities regulations did not
necessarily prohibit traders from trading on their informational advantages.
The NMS “best execution” rules, themselves in many ways a kind of
objectives-based regulatory mandate, offer another example. When first

311. See Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity, Exchange Act Release No.
73,639 (Nov. 19, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249); SEC, STAFF
GUIDANCE ON CURRENT SCI INDUSTRY STANDARDS (2014), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/
2014/staff-guidance-current-sci-industry-standards.pdf [http://perma.cc/3TK6-TQG6].
312. Cf. Deanna Whitestone, The Response to Enron in the United States and Canada:
Are Principles-Based Accounting Standards More Effective at Preventing Financial Fraud?,
11 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 381 (2005) (comparing the effectiveness of a rules-based standard
to a principles-based approach in preventing corporate fraud).
313. See supra p. 995.
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pronounced, they required brokers to provide the most advantageous order
execution for their customers, which was at least assumed to be based on
price. But how specifically they were to be implemented was largely left to
market participants.
Technology developed, however, in ways to
differentiate the market and customer demands that justified several
interpretations of the rule. Specifically, broker-dealers realized that their
customers, especially large investment funds seeking to quickly deleverage,
occasionally valued speed and certainty of execution over price. So with
little explicit guidance, broker-dealers interpreted the parameters in ways
that allowed them to charge premiums (higher than other brokers) where
they offered other services promising superior execution. The upshot has
been arguably more competition in the provision of trading services. But
one consequence has been a gradual decline of the rule into irrelevance in
the absence of supplemental rulemaking and guidance—and increasing
opportunities to skim profits from customers.
As a result, objectives-based regulation can have highly unexpected
consequences, even more than prescriptive regulatory approaches.
Regulatory authorities would have to have both the ability and discretion to
issue emergency orders and take immediate administrative remedial action
where necessary in order to mitigate overly flexible policy interpretations
by market participants. Closely related, in order to be most effective,
objectives-based regulation requires considerable agency resources to
operationalize.
As discussed above, under the current regulatory
dispensation, resources are devoted toward drafting specific rules,
collecting feedback from stakeholders, and crafting proposals in ways to
achieve policy priorities while accommodating diverse interests.314 In a
world of objectives-based processes, by contrast, resources are needed for a
sustained investment in the infrastructure to support additional supervisory
and relationship management personnel with firms, surveillance of market
participants, and ongoing education programs to build more dialogic
relationships with regulated actors.315 As a result, objectives-based
processes generally impose a higher and more permanent cost structure as
compared to the rules-based approach that has characterized securities
regulation since the New Deal.

314. See supra p. 1039.
315. See Awrey, supra note 310, at 283–84; see also Ford, supra note 301, at 289
(observing that even where regulators adopt strategies that are more “hands off” in their
approach to detailed prescriptive rulemaking, it does not mean that they require fewer
regulatory resources); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Reforming Securities Law
Enforcement:
Politics and Money at the Public/Private Divide, in REGULATORY
BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 200, 211 (Cary Coglianese
ed., 2012) (suggesting that higher compensation models would be required for a larger role
for the SEC in prosecuting fraud).
Possibly, alternative supplemental means of
compensation for incentivizing regulatory supervision also would be warranted. See, e.g., M.
Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Pay for Regulator Performance, 85 S. CAL. L. REV.
1003, 1031–32 (2012) (suggesting alternative compensation models for incentivizing better
bank oversight).
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C. Two Models of Adaptive Financial Regulation
The appeal of objectives-based regulation is that it allows the market to
find the most efficient means of meeting given regulatory objectives. But
regulators need not always rely on the private sector for de facto rulemaking
or compliance. Market actors are focused on maximizing profits and act
with limited knowledge beyond their own individual circumstances.
Furthermore, they may not have system-wide information relating to the
practices of competitors and may fail to take into consideration (and simply
disregard) the implications of their conduct for the health of the financial
markets. Compliance techniques and market practices may, as a result,
prove suboptimal.
Because of the inherent limitations of self-regulation, regulatory
authorities, too, can innovate, not only with regard to the substance of
market rules but also in terms of their tactics. Specifically, the SEC has at
its disposal tools to adjust its rulemaking in ways that enable more
knowledgeable, speedy, but incremental rulemaking that is often wellsuited to a world of constant microstructural change. When utilized, this
approach fosters experimentation to create more effective bespoke
responses to new regulatory challenges.
The intellectual, if not practical, heritage of adaptive regulation at large is
considerable, and its theoretical lineage reaches back to the original legal
realists.316 The objective is “not to carve away agency discretion, as
market-based regulation does, but to add to it, albeit in a vastly different
form compared to the front-end model.”317 Under this model, agencies
would not be removed from the decision-making process or
disintermediated by the market as sources of regulatory authority. Instead,
the decisions are made over a broader time horizon that makes the “front
end” and the “back end” of decision making much less relevant.318 As
opposed to crafting one omnibus package of reforms,
agencies employing adaptive management engage in a program of
iterative decisionmaking following a structured, multistep protocol: (1)
definition of the problem, (2) determination of goals and objectives for
management, (3) determination of the baseline, (4) development of
conceptual models, (5) selection of future actions, (6) implementation and

316. See Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 306, at 166. As the two note, “The original realists
stressed the virtues of experimentalism, reflected in Holmes’ famous dissent in Abrams v.
United States where he stressed that even the Constitution ‘is an experiment, as all life is an
experiment.’” See id. (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919)). Jerome Frank
himself, a former Chairman of the SEC, saw himself and other “experimental jurisprudes” as
the “humble servants to the master experimentalist, Franklin Roosevelt.” See id.
317. Craig & Ruhl, supra note 304, at 7 (emphasis omitted).
318. See id. at 5 (noting that while “front-end mode of administrative decisionmaking
does produce agency decisions sooner or later, . . . it ossifies agency practices, politicizes
agency decisions, stultifies flexibility, and generally makes administrative agencies
unadministrative”).
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management actions, (7) monitoring, and (8) evaluation and return to step
(1).319

1. Pilot Programs
In practice, the stage for regulatory experimentalism could play out in
various ways. One approach would be to selectively adopt trial periods for
new regulatory approaches where prospective rules and reforms could be
tested and explored. So for example, the ban on general solicitation could
be lifted for five years, with a sunset provision triggered absent some
additional regulatory blessing. Or more onerous investigatory requirements
on portals could be lifted where other (statistical or algorithmic)
technologies are used to test or limit exposures of retail investors in
crowdfunded securities, but likewise set to expire absent some regulatory
finding that they insufficiently track or identify breaches in prudential
requirements for investors.
To provide a sense of what an experiment could look like, consider the
example of crowdfunding portals and the question of whether they should
be able to provide information to potential investors about the quality of
securities (either credit- or investment-wise) for prospective investors.
From a regulatory standpoint, the fear is that insofar as portals begin to start
differentiating investors, they take on aspects of giving investment advice.
Enabling them to differentiate would thus provide a path around the
Investment Advisers Act and its protections for investors. Portals would
not be subject to the Investment Advisers Act’s important prohibitions
against conflicts of interest and disclosures to investors about the persons
who are paid for advice concerning the desirability of investing in
securities. On the other hand, providing basic kinds of information, like the
credit rating of sponsoring entrepreneurs and education data of the
entrepreneur, could well help investors make wiser decisions.
The question thus arises whether a more permissive regulatory scheme
for portals would end up undermining or bolstering protections for
investors. In many ways, this is a conceptual question and can be addressed
by comparing the nature of the information provided by portals and the
risks such tools would generate for investors. But empirical data could
provide even more concrete information.
Here is how an easy experiment could be conducted: a study could be
announced allowing some portals, upon randomized selection, to provide
deeper levels of disclosure to investors. The first test group would be
permitted to evaluate the company and provide information to the public
relating to easily understandable metrics. These metrics could include
FICO or credit scores (where the entrepreneur agrees) or the answers to
simple queries—such as whether the entrepreneur has taken or passed a
financial statement analysis course or other business course or whether the
entrepreneur has enrolled in a prep course for emerging managers

319. See id. at 7.
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established by the portal. A second test group would meanwhile be
permitted to employ all of the above, as well as screen issuances placed on
its platform, and advertise the screening. Finally, a control group would
consist of portals under the current regulatory regime, subject to deep
restrictions regarding the degree to which issuer information can be
provided to the public.
Throughout the pilot period, participating portals would be required to
collect and report the following data to the SEC:
1) The number of campaigns successfully completed;
2) The speed at which campaigns are successfully completed
(capital accumulation);
3) Investor complaints lodged against the portal investments; and
4) The number of failed ventures (in all cases, entrepreneurs whose
ventures failed would be required to report to the portals, within
five days, the liquidation of their business).
An initial assessment could then be conducted one year after the
commencement of the pilot. The assessment could include:
1) Assessments of the statistical impact of providing information on
the quality of investment decisions by investors;
2) Assessments of the economic impact of providing information on
the speed of capital accumulation; and
3) Assessments of the economic impact of providing information on
the profits of the portal.
Thereafter, a rule could be drafted, or a subsequent extension of the
experiment (or a different experiment under other parameters) could be
conducted, depending on the results of the experiment and conclusiveness
of the data received.
The idea of such an approach would, in short, be to create data for
making regulatory decisions, much as the Food and Drug Administration
does for experimental drugs. Along these lines, regulatory experimentation
would allow a peek into the likely consequences of any particular policy
action. Regulators could ask some of the questions central to policymaking
in today’s rapidly changing market infrastructure in advance: What should
be the parameters for solicitation online and in an internet economy? What
reasonable verification steps should be used for investor accreditation or
wealth thresholds for crowdfunding? What kinds of potential innovations
can and should be deployed to police the speed of financial transactions and
the comparative advantages (and market risks) that such speed generates?
The deployment of such strategies would represent a considerable change
in regulatory tactics for today’s regulators. As mentioned above, the SEC
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often relies on no-action letters to test varying approaches.320 And it can
even promote, as seen in the case of FundersClub, a channel of further
market disintermediation by allowing new business models to adapt to the
platform and structure of the internet. That said, no-action letters are not
controlled experiments. They do not require data collection and reporting
or, for that matter, any iterative contact or information sharing with
regulators during the course of the relevant conduct. As a result, they
provide only a limited channel for bolstering regulatory expertise.
Meanwhile, from the standpoint of market participants, no-action letters
offer relief only to the firm making a request and, even then, only indicate
that the SEC staff would not recommend that the Commission take
enforcement action against the requester based on the facts and
representations described in the individual’s or entity’s request. No
guarantees are made.
Experimentalism, however, is not in itself new to securities regulation.
The SEC has conducted more formal experiments and does so even today.
The order handling rules, discussed above,321 were phased in on a pilot
basis, just as rules relating to short sales. And the national market system,
in particular, has used the strategy. In 2011, the NYSE and other exchanges
pushed for pilot circuit-breaker programs to help mitigate the impact of
flash crashes.322 And more recently, in 2014, the SEC announced a oneyear pilot program to widen minimum quoting and trading increments (or
“tick sizes”) for small-cap stocks.323 Instead of regulating the field in its
entirety, the program instructed FINRA and national securities exchanges to
divide stocks of firms with market capitalizations of $5 billion or less into
three test groups of four hundred stocks and a control group.324 The control
group will use the current tick size of one cent per share, while the test
groups will all quote small-cap shares at five-cent minimum increments,
according to a news release from the SEC.325
The idea behind the program is to test whether wider tick sizes increase
the liquidity for smaller stocks. Theoretically, a wider spread between bid
and offer prices would mean more profits for dealers and market makers,
though it also could mean higher commissions and charges for individuals
when they trade. The policy question is whether these hidden charges
would be worthwhile to the extent they generated greater interest by traders

320. See supra p. 1035.
321. See supra pp. 1006–07.
322. SEC: Circuit Breakers Pilot Programs to Expire April 11, 2011, BLOOMBERG,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aMeT4yIl2fuI (last visited
Nov. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/L9SW-R7ZT].
323. Press Release, SEC, SEC Approves Pilot to Assess Tick Size Impact for Smaller
Companies (May 6, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-82.html [http://
perma.cc/7QV7-ATYX].
324. Id.
325. Id. In one test group, trading would continue to occur at any price increment that is
permitted today; in the second, trading would be done in five cent increments; and in the
third group, securities would be subject to a “trade-at” requirement, which prevents price
matching by a trading center that is not displaying the best bid or offer.
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and thus increase demand for stock issuances by the small-cap firms. After
reviewing the data, agency officials would examine what impact the
reforms would have on the quality of the issuances and whether the
program should be extended.
Notice that this kind of approach allows for multitiered rulemaking.
Proposals are not one-shot exercises memorialized into law. And the data
itself can help to inform regulatory decisions as well as (if necessary)
further stakeholder comments. It generates, in short, the opportunity for a
positive informational feedback loop and, by extension, better grounded
decision making.
That said, experimentation of this sort is far from celebrated. The SEC
has no webpage or official policy toward pilot programs. Neither are there
formal protocols about when and under what circumstances they are used.
As a result, without strict guidance, the reliance on data-driven exercises is
driven by regulatory agendas and politics, as opposed to strict policy
mandates.
2. Innovation Hubs
Another more ambitious approach involves shifting from micro-level
experimentation to system-wide enterprise zones for financial market
compliance and regulatory adaptation. Compliance costs, for example,
could be offset or subsidized by other forms of regulatory assistance or
other relief where they meet or surpass basic minimum standards. So, for
example, avenues of special information sharing and expedited assistance
could be opened with targeted industry members for the fulfillment of
desired regulatory objectives. Or investment tax credits could be provided
for market participants that undertake strategies to bolster investor
protection or market stability.326
Along these lines, incentives could be provided to develop new
techniques or data analysis infrastructures for portals to help ensure that
investors have not breached personal investment limits promulgated under
the JOBS Act. Or regulators could work alongside 144A websites to
deliver and bless new data analytics that help ensure that ultimate
purchasers of securities are accredited investors. Or market-making
obligations could be eased where market infrastructures adopted speed
bumps for trading or “off switches” to shut down trading where volatility is
poised to generate a flash crash. In any event, technology could be
leveraged in ways that not only change the cost structure and competition
within markets—and even obscure the operations of markets and price
discovery—but that also enhance prudential safeguards for investors.
This, too, is not an entirely novel proposal. In 2014, for example, the
U.K.’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) launched an “innovation hub”
326. See Chris Brummer & Daniel Gorfine, Crowdfunding: The Next Big Thing, 57
MILKEN INST. REV. 66, 72 (2013). This approach is not unprecedented. See THE WHITE
HOUSE, SOLAR PROGRESS REPORT: ADVANCING TOWARD A CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE 5 (2014)
(examining the investment tax credit for solar panels).
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aimed at helping to support and more effectively oversee a team of experts
to in turn support financial technology startups that demonstrate that their
innovations can help support consumers, whether individuals or
businesses.327 Additionally, the hub will have a designated function of
exploring how regulation can be adapted not only to contain growth, but
also to foster it alongside investor protection. To do the job, the FCA will
reportedly help steer young companies, or established companies with new
models or financial products, through the regulatory process—and likewise
learn new ways to administer more effective rules adapted to evolving
technological developments.328
It also is designed to help regulators familiarize themselves with new
technology. This in and of itself will require considerable face-to-face
engagement for formal applications submitted by technology companies, as
well as reiterated contact between regulators and regulated entities prior to
the promulgation of rules.329 Thus, the innovation hub will provide
qualifying businesses with a dedicated contact for innovation-related
queries, including individual guidance and continued additional support for
up to a year after authorization in order to help developers understand the
regulatory framework and how it applies to them.330 In this way, areas of
likely complexity can be identified early on, to help both focus regulators
on potential challenges and ensure that potential applications are processed
as quickly as possible.
And the United Kingdom is not alone. For the last two decades,
countries have developed a variety of mechanisms to help spur not only
market but also regulatory innovation and adaptability. China, for one, has
established a “Shanghai Free Trade Zone” designed to facilitate capital
account liberalization.331 As part of this process, the government has
designated Shanghai as the primary locus for the experimentation and
launching of market reforms.332 Keys to this have included an array of
regulatory measures (1) connecting mainland stock exchanges to Hong
Kong, (2) allowing more cross-border investment, and (3) enabling foreign

327. Anna Irrera, FCA Out to ‘Unlock’ Fintech Innovation, FIN. NEWS (Oct. 28, 2014),
http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2014-10-28/fca-launches-innovation-hub-for-fintechstartups?ea9c8a2de0ee111045601ab04d673622 [http://perma.cc/W4FG-M64P].
328. Financial Services and Fintech: What Is the FCA’s “Project Innovate”?, OSBORNE
CLARKE (June 13, 2014), http://www.osborneclarke.com/connected-insights/blog/financialservices-and-Fintech-what-fcas-project-innovate/ [http://perma.cc/A583-Q2BY].
329. See “There Is Little That Bureaucrats Hate More than Innovation”: The FCA
Opens Its Innovation Hub, OSBORNE CLARKE (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.osborneclarke.
com/connected-insights/blog/there-little-bureaucrats-hate-more-innovation-fca-opens-itsinnovation-hub/ [http://perma.cc/CUL9-APYH].
330. Id.
331. J.P. MORGAN, ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC RESEARCH, https://www.jpmorgan.com/
cm/BlobServer/China_Highlights_of_the_Shanghai_Free_Trade_Zone.pdf?blobkey=id&blo
bwhere=1320623477943&blobheader=application/pdf&blobheadername1=CacheControl&blobheadervalue1=private&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs (last visited
Nov. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/2BHW-5GYA].
332. Id.
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direct investment into the country.333 Market reforms have additionally
embraced a number of regulatory enhancements. For each program, new
rules have been unveiled, usually on a “pilot” basis, ranging from issues as
diverse as quotas permitted to foreign funds and investors putting their
capital to work onshore to changes in derivatives contracts to allow better
netting of exposures in case of a counterparty default. The key to the
process has, above all, been the cautious opening of the market, while also
instituting new rules to support the process. Incremental and targeted, the
process relies on experiments that are under the auspices of authorities
within the zone and, if successful, are then “exported” to the rest of the
country, or as seen in the case of the recent slowdown of China’s economy,
slowed precipitously.
That said, securing an “innovation dividend” flowing from adaptive
compliance systems requires deep procedural reforms in the United States.
Arguably the same kinds of administrative hurdles and procedures like
notice and comment would be required on the back end (postexperimentation) as on the front end.334 Furthermore, the promulgation of
rules generally requires a range of internal clearing processes, dictated by
courts and executive orders, and internal policymaking traditions. Some of
these clearance processes, like cost-benefit analyses, could be streamlined,
or even shortened in light of the new information generated by controlled
regulatory experiments. Divvying rulemaking into two stages could,
however, effectively double the procedural load required to pass rules as a
range of constituencies (from chief counsel offices of divisions to general
counsel to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)—the
executive office in charge of ironically streamlining regulatory costs) would
need consulting at varying stages of the policymaking process. As a result,
a twenty-first-century securities framework would ideally create a set of
standards enabling experimentation, either through an objectives-based
regime or via ex ante rules, which would provide a means to leverage
technology for both efficiency and investor protection.
Incentive programs, too, would run across a range of regulatory
limitations, both procedural and substantive. Not only would legislation
have to be amended in order to provide the basis for offering explicit
incentives in other regulatory sectors (like tax), but prudential rules also

333. Jennifer Hughes, HK-Shanghai Stock Link Poised to Launch, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 11,
2014, at 22; HOGAN LOVELLS, FINANCIAL REFORMS FOR THE SHANGHAI (PILOT) FREE TRADE
ZONE: SLOWLY COMING INTO FOCUS (2014), http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/
aa8faa93-3cd0-4794-8561-14f49ed5e3ec/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/02529efd222a-4c41-97e3-485157f087aa/SHALIB01-%231091563-v6-Client_Alert__Financial_Reforms_for_the_Shanghai_%28Pilot%29_Fre.pdf [http://perma.cc/UUM4-P3
CD].
334. For example, the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–20 (2012),
established the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of
Management and Budget. Under Executive Order 12866, OIRA is responsible for reviewing
agency draft regulations before publication. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735
(Sept. 30, 1993). Divvying rulemaking into two stages may mean that rules that involve a
collection of information would need to receive OIRA approval twice.
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could require amending in nontraditional ways. For example, if a
crowdfunding site wanted to rate borrowers in order to help investors, say
by posting scores for companies that indicate the degree to which they have
gone beyond minimum disclosures of the JOBS Act, it would be viewed as
effectively “advising” them and would thereby become a broker-dealer in
the eyes of securities regulators.335 Thus, in order to assist firms in the
provision of new investor protections, substantive regulatory requirements
in the Exchange Act and Investment Advisor Act would require amending
or, at a minimum, special exemptions.
Moreover, innovation zones, trial periods, and experimentation, like
objectives-based regulation, could increase considerably the costs of
regulation, at least as compared to traditional administrative processes. As
indicated above, resources must be expended not only to propose legislation
and review comments, but also to create the parameters for
experimentation, develop proper safeguards, and examine the results for
developing and refining initial policy hunches. Furthermore, even after
developing thoughtful policy approaches, it will likely be necessary to
periodically update and refine policies in ways to speak to changes in
market practices or infrastructures. Thus, more resources would likely be
necessary than those utilized in prescriptive, rules-based models of
oversight that have dominated regulation since the 1930s.
With this in mind, the smartest policy approaches will have to leverage
regulatory tools in thoughtful, strategic ways. In areas of financial market
regulation, traditional, rules-based oversight and regulation is highly
appropriate in areas either spared by rapid structural disintermediation or
where the pace of change is predictable, allowing authorities to stay ahead
of the regulatory curve. By contrast, objectives-based approaches should be
deployed where the velocity of innovation is highest, but where
fundamental changes to the relationship between market participants remain
stable enough for efficient (though at times expensive) enforcement.
Experimentation and pilot programs, which likely involve the greatest
capital resources, should, meanwhile, be practiced sparingly and
strategically, either where project designs can minimize costs or where
uncertainty is greatest and the potential risks to investor protection—market
stability or capital formation—is highest. That way, hypotheses can be
tested and reforms made in a way in which policymakers are informed by
not only the opinions of stakeholders, but also market data and empirical
evidence.

335. This is a lesson learned the hard way by both Lending Club and Prosper. See Randall
Smith, Not Banks, but Still Lending Money and Drawing Investors, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7,
2013, 10:32 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/07/not-banks-but-still-lending-anddrawing-investors/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (“Both Florida and Missouri fined
[Lending Club] $100,000 each last year for selling unregistered securities.”)
[http://perma.cc/389A-QCBD]; Prosper Fined $1 Million; Faces Class Action Lawsuit from
Lenders, PROSPER LENDING REV. (Dec. 2, 2008, 10:34 AM), http://prosperlending.
blogspot.com/2008/12/prosper-fined-1-million.html (describing Prosper’s $1 million
settlement for selling unregistered securities) [http://perma.cc/7AUH-32TH].
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In both of the latter two instances, technology should be embraced as a
source of not only regulatory risk, but also of regulatory opportunity. One
of the primary challenges that disruptive technology poses is that
technology moves quickly, outstripping the capacity of regulators to
understand or respond to change. To better equip them, information
technology should be deployed to help keep investors better informed of the
risks concerning their investments, without unnecessarily hiking disclosure
costs. But even more can be done. Regulators can themselves develop
algorithmic tools to help police fraud online. Information processing data
analytics, similarly, could (and should) be used to constantly measure
outcomes in submarkets like 144A or alternative venues like dark pools.
And a flexible administrative platform could be developed across the SEC
and other agencies, building on these tools, to enable regulators to adapt
quickly to changing circumstances and ensure satisfaction of regulatory
goals. Only at that point will regulators find themselves in a position not
only to respond to disruptive innovation, but to track it in real time and,
even more importantly, to mitigate its excesses.
CONCLUSION
The accelerating interplay of law and technology in securities markets is
underdeveloped, both descriptively and normatively. All too often,
commentators have assumed that though markets change, regulation is itself
operationalized against a static, stable set of market gatekeepers, and the
literature has failed to account for—and connect—the varied channels
through which technology transforms markets. As a result, the impact of
technology on capital markets regulation has itself been obfuscated. This
Article has attempted to provide clarity, by tracing the regulatory structure
that guides securities law approaches and then describing how deep
microstructural changes in twenty-first-century capital markets are
transforming the regulatory ecosystem across issue areas.
The preceding pages demonstrated that not all “disruption” is the same
and that changes in securities issuances and investment, market
microstructure, and trading have come from a variety of quarters. In some
instances, the ability to connect traders in far-flung places more effectively
and faster than ever before has changed the strategic dynamics driving
market liquidity, whereas in others, advances in artificial intelligence have
led to equally profound results for trading. And in yet other instances,
developments in regulatory approaches, which reflect as much changes in
political cycles as economic ones, can enable incremental changes that,
when paired with revolutions in information technology, can fundamentally
restructure securities markets. In the process, traditional gatekeepers have
been increasingly sidelined as new actors occupy central positions in the
processing of capital transactions.
Notably, this development is not in itself a necessarily “bad” one.
Indeed, it is not only capital markets that have changed, but society as well.
With new platforms (web based and otherwise), forms of media, and
interconnectivity, the ability to disseminate information is greater than at
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any previous point in history, as are the potential means by which investors
can arm themselves with information before making investments or trades.
But there are challenges. Just as the modes and means of disseminating
information have multiplied, so have opportunities with which fraud can be
conducted and markets manipulated. Furthermore, changes in the market
ecosystem and competitive dynamics are changing the incentives for market
participants and gatekeepers in ways that may not always bolster financial
stability or investor protection. Issuers are able to raise as much capital via
nonpublic devices and private placement infrastructure as through IPOs;
exchanges are no longer sources of capital but increasingly seekers of
liquidity; and broker-dealers are able to connect investors in ways that they
increasingly resemble exchanges.
All along, from a theoretical and policy perspective, basic tenets of
securities regulation are undergoing profound transformation. Just what a
“public” offering means is no longer easy to identify when private markets
enjoy breadths and levels of participation that rival traditional section 5
offerings. “Listings” no longer are exclusively relegated to exchange
architecture, as private platforms, websites, and portals can advertise
offerings for sale and, in some instances, trading. Even the concept of an
“exchange” has been moved as trading volumes are increasingly located in
venues that, though not always regulated as exchanges, are hosting the
lion’s share of secondary trading—trading that is itself done via computers
rather than human beings.
Although the extent to which existing administrative tools are capable of
engaging these challenges is not entirely known, indications are that New
Deal regulatory procedures will need to be rethought and reimagined in
order to cope with the dynamic change animating markets and market
activity. In a world where trades are executed in milliseconds, regulatory
ruminations that drag on for months, just to be quickly made irrelevant or
outdated once implemented, seem flat-footed.
Furthermore, where
information is sparse—given the unpredictability about law, markets, and
their interaction with one another—flexibility seems warranted and needed
in twenty-first-century market regulation. In particular, a thoughtful pivot
to regulatory experimentalism is warranted for areas like market
infrastructure that are characterized by constant flux. Objectives-based
regulation, paired with trial-and-error experimentation and adaptation are
obvious administrative responses that should be incorporated into existing
administrative procedures along with the resources to supervise such new
strategies. In that way, regulators can meet the challenges of regulating
market participants in a world where not only the behavior of regulated
entities changes, but also the regulated entities themselves.

